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INTRODUCTORY NOTE
The three following lectures form the fourth series delivered
at the University of Illinois on a foundation established in
1935 by Mrs. George E. Frazer of Winnetka, Illinois, as a
memorial to her father, the late Edmund Janes James, Presi-
dent of the University from 1904 to 1920. Under the terms
of the gift the lecturers are chosen by a committee selected
from the professors of political science and economics.
The first series of lectures, published in 1938, included a
"Biographical Note on President James," by Evarts B. Greene,
Professor of History at Columbia University (formerly Pro-
fessor of History and Dean of the College of Literature and
Arts at the University of Illinois), and lectures on: "The
American State University: A Problem in Political Science,"
by Herman G. James, President of Ohio University; "Public
Service and the University Graduate," by Leonard D. White,
Member of the United States Civil Service Commission and
Professor of Public Administration, University of Chicago;
and "The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Nation,"
by Robert E. Cushman, Professor of Government, Cornell
University.
The second series, published in 1941, included lectures on:
"The Constitution in Transition," by Thomas Reed Powell,
Story Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; "The Com-
promise Principle in Politics," by T. V. Smith, Congressman-
at-Large from Illinois and Professor of Philosophy at the
University of Chicago; and "Historical Foundations for a
Democratic China," by Dr. Hu Shih, Chinese Ambassador to
the United States.
The third series, published in 1944, included lectures on:
"Post-War Planning," by Charles E. Merriam, Professor of
Political Science, University of Chicago, and Member of
the National Resources Planning Board ; "Democracy and the
Manpower Crisis," by Clarence A. Dykstra, President of the
University of Wisconsin and first Director of Selective
Service; and "Democratic Ideals: London, Ottawa, Welling-
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ton, Canberra, Washington," by Allan Nevins, Professor of
History, Columbia University, and then recently returned
from an extensive war mission to Australia and New Zealand.
The lectures in the fourth series were deliberately related
to problems of special international significance at the mo-
ment of delivery, but in the light of developing events they
may as well be considered expert contributions to an un-
derstanding of present, if not continuous, problems of
government.
Clarence A. Berdahl
H. M. Gray
John M. Mathews
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THE STRATEGY AND POLITICS
OF RAW MATERIALS IN
PEACE AND WAR

THE STRATEGY AND POLITICS
OF RAW MATERIALS IN
PEACE AND WAR 1
By W. Y. Elliott
Professor of Government in Harvard University and
Vice-Chairman of the War Production Board
It is a privilege to be a James Lecturer at the University of
Illinois. This series of lectures has produced some of the most
outstanding contributions to the discussions of public policy
that have been made in American academic circles. It is a par-
ticular pleasure to pay tribute to the great figure honored by
their name. It is not just that President James was a Harvard
man, for I do not believe that all Harvard men are great—
though persistent statement of this conviction may sometime
cost me my chair! Nor is it just that I have respect for any
professor who can weather governmental stresses the way
President James did during World War I. Nevertheless, that
is no small feat and should not be underestimated. A man who
is able to develop a strong educational program in a large
University, to house it in these fine buildings, to attract a
faculty of sound scholars, to maintain excellent relationships
with the general public as well as with the State authorities, is
indeed a man of stature. His scholarly background at North-
western, Harvard, Halle, his eight years as Professor of
Public Finance at the University of Pennsylvania, his five
years as Professor of Public Administration at the University
of Chicago, and his two years as President of Northwestern
University gave him the best traditions and pertinent experi-
ence for the significant life of public service which he lived.
During the sixteen years that he was President of the Univer-
sity of Illinois, from 1904 to 1920, he was recognized as one of
the outstanding university presidents in the United States. He
left a great institution which has grown still greater because
it was soundly grounded.
Mrs. George E. Frazer's memorial to her father in the
1 Delivered April 17, 1945.
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form of these lectures is a public service in President James'
best tradition. I say this as a beneficiary of previous pub-
lications of these lectures in their printed form. As one who
has the honor of giving a lecture under these auspices, I shall
try to maintain the high standard set by my predecessors.
The Problem of Stockpiling
I want to discuss with you tonight the problem of "stock-
piling," not only because of the immediate importance that it
has had for the successful course of this war, but also because
of its implications for the future of a world that is, we hope,
emerging into an era of stable peace. The politics of stock-
piling in themselves reflect most of the difficulties of executive,
legislative, and administrative action in our national govern-
ment as well as some of the most vexing problems that will
continue to arise in the international field. It goes to the core
of the interplay of economics and public policy.
The term "stockpiling" has been used to cover the de-
liberate building of reserves of strategic materials— for pro-
tection during wartime against inadequate supplies to carry
on the production programs necessitated by modern total war. 2
Every prudent business carries inventories calculated to pro-
tect it against emergency interruptions of its supplies. Under
the conditions of modern industrialism, a nation must build
up huge stocks of those materials without which its whole
civilized standard of living, as well as its chances of survival,
and victory in warfare, are jeopardized.
2 The official Army-Navy Munitions Board definition of strategic and
critical materials for stockpiling purposes is as follows: "Strategic and
critical materials are those materials required for essential uses in a war
emergency, the procurement of which in adequate quantities, quality, and
time is sufficiently uncertain for any reason to require prior provision for
the supply thereof."
Within this definition, materials are listed either in Group A, Group B,
or Group C according to the following provisions:
Group A comprises those strategic and critical materials for which
stockpiling' is deemed the only satisfactory means of insuring an adequate
supply for a future emergency.
Group. B comprises additional strategic and critical materials which can
be insured either by stimulation of North American production or by partial
or complete use of available substitutes.
Group C comprises those strategic and critical materials which are not
recommended for long term stockpiling because the difficulties of storage
are sufficient to outweigh the advantages to be gained by this means of in-
suring adequate future supply.
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Stockpiling in World War I
In 1 9 14, the prediction that World War I was upon us in the
summer days of that fateful year was widely expressed in
various foreign offices because Germany had begun to import
through Holland stocks of copper, tin, and rubber at rates
several hundred per cent beyond her normal volume of use.
However, Germany's efforts to provide for a self-sufficient
economy by piling up stocks of these important materials, from
which she was almost certain to be cut off, did not prove to be
adequate, even with the extension of her control over substan-
tial parts of Eastern Europe after the downfall of Russia. She
was unable to continue the production of the necessary ma-
terials of war without very inferior substitutes which helped to
bring about her collapse. Although the creation of reserve
stocks is usually planned in terms of nonperishable items, there
are historic times and special circumstances which lend them-
selves to the creation of protective stocks in perishables as
well. For example, the submarine blockade of England showed
that food itself in an importing nation is a critical item requir-
ing stockpiling. The same situation was true of the tight block-
ade imposed by the Allies on Germany, for it was food short-
ages, as much as anything else, that helped to destroy the
morale of Germany in World War I.
Few people are aware that we ourselves suffered from
critical material shortages that almost brought our own pro-
gram to a standstill during World War I. We were at one
time within a very few weeks of the exhaustion of our manga-
nese supply which is essential to modern steel production. Had
we not been able to turn to Brazil for a greatly accelerated
production program during the emergency, we might well have
been knocked out of an effective war program. At that time,
we had small difficulty in maintaining access to the raw ma-
terials of the Far East, since Japan was allied with us against
Germany. We did not then have the prospect of critical short-
ages of tin, rubber, and quinine, which have been so difficult
a problem in this war.
For Britain, the cutting off of petroleum reserves, ac-
cessible through her fleet, would be fatal to any war effort. The
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British, therefore, followed the German pattern of trying to
build up at least a limited production of oil from coal through
the hydrogenization process. Germany had learned this lesson
thoroughly when she faced a breakdown of her internal trans-
portation, after the loss of the Rumanian oil reserves toward
the end of the last war.
The Imperatives of Stockpiling
In order to fight a war without imports, it is not enough for a
modern nation to have within its own boundaries reserves that
are adequate for its peacetime uses. The tremendously ex-
panded production requirements of wartime lead to astro-
nomical increases in the use of materials such as aluminum and
magnesium. The consumption of iron ore, coal, and all the
products that go into steel, such as manganese, chromium,
tungsten, and alloying materials, as molybdenum and nickel,
are doubled and trebled. Furthermore, there is the inevitable
question of the capacity of facilities for treating these ma-
terials. If domestic deposits are low grade, they must be bene-
ficiated to bring them up to usable standards. This often in-
volves the expenditure, not only of hundreds of millions of
dollars, but of great amounts of manpower and equipment
which could be more directly applied to the war effort.
There is no single nation which, on a prewar basis, is self-
sufficient in strategic materials against the threat of war, not
even the United States or Russia. The very vulnerability of
some nations leads them to assume the classification of "have
nots" and to reach out for territory which would assure them
possession within their own control of the sources of raw
materials needed for fighting modern war. Japan first took
over Manchukuo, industrialized it, and then reached out
further into China, eventually launching her treacherous attack
on Pearl. Harbor, in order to prepare for the acquisition of
the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, and British Malaya,
for the purpose of forming a self-sufficient empire which
would dominate the entire Far East. 3 Nazi Germany, though
3 G. C. Allen, M. S. Gordon, E. B. Schumpeter, and E. F. Penrose,
The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo 1930-1940 (Macmillan, 1041,
944 PP.)-
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professing no colonial designs, continually upset European
equilibrium by annexing territories, primarily with the inten-
tion of acquiring, not German populations alone, but the equip-
ment and the raw materials of the areas which these conquests
would insure. Italy followed the same pattern from Ethiopia
onward, and was led to give aid to Spain under Franco in
considerable measure because of her dependence upon Spanish
minerals for her armament program. Spain's production of
such metals as lead, tungsten, pyrites, and the iron ore and
phosphates of North Africa, were important to the Italian
war economy. Russia possessed the resources but required a
succession of Five-Year Plans to develop them. Every energy
of Stalin was bent upon securing a reserve of production be-
hind the Ural mountains, out of bombing range of the
Germans, to supplement the great developments of the
Ukraine, the Don, and the Volga basins, as well as the tre-
mendous oil reserves of the Caucasus and the Black Sea
region.
Even the United States was not insensible to the necessity
of securing some reserves of the materials which are not
adequately produced within our own borders, many of which
can not be produced in amounts needed for a war economy
at any price, and others of which require the expenditure of
the most wasteful amounts of manpower upon domestic low
grade reserves. The Army-Navy Munitions Board was cre-
ated after the last war by joint action of the War and Navy
Departments to study these and allied problems as the result
of the recommendations of the Baruch War Industries Board.
During the interim between 1919 and 1939, a period of 20
years in which the American people vainly hoped for peace
and worked for disarmament without providing guarantees
of international security, very little was done of a practical
character to assure this country of adequate reserves at the
outbreak of war. If we were to be cut off from world re-
sources, as proved to be the case in several important in-
stances, our preparations were entirely inadequate. 4
* For a timetable of stockpiling legislation see Appendix I.
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People who have been working on a "business as usual"
basis find it hard to realize that there can ever be an inter-
ruption of supplies which have been forthcoming conven-
iently and easily through the normal channels of commerce.
There is also a natural reluctance to disturb these channels
by a government procurement program superimposed upon
private trade during peace times. Traders are afraid of the
effect upon the market in their daily operations. Both traders
and the producing countries, including our own domestic
producers, are fearful of large stockpiles that may overhang
the market, be sold by the government, or merely be suspended
like the sword of Damocles over the prices charged by pro-
ducers and private holders of stocks.
Reasons for Public Purchase Programs as
Against Privately Owned Stoc\piles
There are many reasons why only a government procurement
program can succeed in building adequate stocks for war-
time use, and why it is necessary to have these stocks, even in
a country so fortunate as is the United States in possession
within its own boundaries of most of the basic raw materials
needed to fight a war.
The first of these reasons is the fact that the necessity for
a rapid expansion of mining facilities may delay, even though
it be pushed with the utmost speed, the processing and manu-
facturing programs which in wartime permit of no delay.
We were fortunate in this war, as in the last, in having sub-
stantially two years of freedom from enemy attack in which to
build up the domestic production necessary to undertake a
war program. It was not really until the middle of 1941 that
our production program for munitions got under way. Up to
that time, we had been increasing our ability to produce the
necessary basic metals and expanding the processing and
fabricating facilities.
I well remember the early summer of 1940 when some of
us went to Washington with the National Defense Advisory
Commission to begin a program which should have been long
since under way, in preparation for the war that we now
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know to have been inevitable, if we were to survive as a
nation. The difficult decisions that were made during that
summer resulted in tremendous new facilities for the pro-
duction of steel, aluminum, magnesium, and eventually rubber,
before we could turn to the more immediate production of
arms themselves. New mines had to be opened up, new plant
facilities had to be put in at the raw materials stage, produc-
tion had to be encouraged abroad as well as at home, in order
to meet the tremendous requirements for arming our friends
of that time, our Allies of today. It would have been possible
perhaps to have increased the production of steel in this
country to one hundred million tons a year by the outlay of
still further facilities, but a careful evaluation had to be made
between the timing of the returns from such a long range
investment, and the immediate returns for supplying arms to
England, as well as for getting our own defense program
under way. Consequently, we actually put in new facilities for
steel only to an amount that would bring up total production
to slightly more than ninety million tons at wartime capacity.
No small part of this problem was the difficulty of securing
sufficient minerals, as manganese and alloying metals, to push
the production of steel beyond this figure. The consequence
was that we have had to suffer from short steel supplies
throughout the war for meeting essential civilian war-sup-
porting needs in addition to military requirements.
The second reason for building stockpiles through govern-
ment purchase is that private traders can not afford to carry
the enormous inventories needed for war protection. They can
not be certain in the first place that the war is going to take
place, and investments in what may turn out to be idle stocks
are too heavy to expect them to risk. The steel industry, for ex-
ample, warned by its experience in the last war, had built up
stocks of manganese in this country to between nine months'
and a year's requirements for normal operations. This was,
however, not much more than half the amount required for
wartime operations. It was, accordingly, necessary for the
government to acquire manganese from every source, domestic
and foreign, as rapidly as possible, this despite the fact that
manganese was one of the commodities which industries were
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willing to carry in long supply because of its natural distribu-
tion outside the United States. No private corporation could
afford to make the costly investment in materials, as quartz
crystals, industrial diamonds, strategic grades of mica, and
graphite, which were absolutely essential if we were to be
relatively well protected against the loss of sources of these
supplies.
The third reason for having publicly owned stockpiles in-
side the country before the actual outbreak of war lies in the
tremendous cost in shipping that is otherwise involved in con-
tinuing imports, even from territories that are accessible as
producers. Shipping tends to become scarce in wartime, if
only because of the delays involved in convoys, with the added
problems of naval protection in all the seas of the world.
Some of those seas, as we have learned, may be closed early.
We have been all too effectively cut off from the Philippines,
from the British and Dutch possessions in the East Indies, and
from, much of the Pacific until the present time. At an earlier
stage in the war, there was every prospect that we might be
cut off from India with all that would have meant in the loss
of raw materials that India has provided in the war effort.
Furthermore, heavy shipping losses were almost inevitably a
part of large-scale war against powers with submarines and
naval commercial raiders, such as were possessed by both
Germany and Japan. There was a period, for instance, in
which we lost about one hundred ships in the short-haul
bauxite trade between the United States and the Caribbean
Guianas. This was at a time when we could ill afford to lose
a single ship ; but our whole aviation program depended upon
continuing this import of foreign high grade bauxite until we
could get a production program going on a large scale on this
Continent which would produce aluminum from domestic
run-of-the-mine, lower grade, bauxite. It is, therefore, neces-
sary to have stocks adequate to supplement domestic produc-
tion safely inside the country, if we are not to expose ourselves
to the loss of access to world supplies outside. This fact was.
borne home to us as we watched the sinking rates off both
the East and West coasts of Africa at the height of the sub-
marine campaign. There was one time when a single slow
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vessel had loaded aboard it so much strategic mica and graphite
from Madagascar that its loss would have had, I am afraid,
crippling effects upon some of our most important programs.
Still a fourth point that makes necessary the import of
strategic materials stocks prior to a war lies in the possible loss
of the sources of supply themselves, either through enemy
action such as that which overtook us in the Far East, or
through enemy economic warfare which pre-empts sources of
supply that normally fall within the range of our naval and
shipping control. We lost, in the early stages of the war, very
large amounts of mica and quartz crystals from Brazil and of
tungsten and other metals from the West Coast of South
America because the Axis powers bought up supplies and sat
upon them even when they did not export them. Japan was
able to continue smuggling operations until after Pearl Har-
bor, though for the five or six months prior to Pearl Harbor
we had really begun to get the upper hand in our economic
warfare efforts to procure supplies from neutral countries,
including Spain, Portugal, and Turkey.
There are other reasons, too, which can be mentioned in
passing, for not waiting until war is upon us before endeavor-
ing to hedge against its impact. Grades and qualities of these
materials are ours for the choosing prior to the emergency.
Later we may have to take what we can get. Again, there is a
better utilization of labor and equipment for the movement
of stocks under peacetime conditions. And last, but not least,
is the absence of the competition of various wartime procure-
ment agencies who scramble for the same source of supply.
Public purchase prior to the existence of competition among
competing national and international procurement agencies
goes a long way toward expeditious allocations to industry in
the shortest possible time.
Failure to Stockpile Strategic Material Prior
to World War II
Under these circumstances, one may wonder that no more real
efforts were made prior to this war to attempt public purchas-
ing of raw materials. Perhaps the first thorough study of this
{i9l
problem that was published was Mr. Brooks Emeny's The
Strategy of Raw Materials. 5 Mr. Emeny's book, which was
the product of close collaboration with the Army-Navy Muni-
tions Board and the committees with which it worked in
Washington until 1934, illustrated the very limited view that
those agencies took on the range of strategic and critical
materials. He recommended at that time the stockpiling in
rather small amounts of only manganese, antimony, and one or
two minor metals.
Under the authority of Public Act No. 117, June 7, 1939,
the Army-Navy Munitions Board acquired orlly $70,000,000
worth of strategic materials— specifically, cadmium, chrome
ore, industrial diamonds, manganese ore, Manila fiber, mer-
cury, mica (block and splittings), monazite sand, optical glass,
quartz crystals, quinine hydrobromide, quinine sulphate, tin
(pig), and tungsten ore. In addition, the Commodity Credit
Corporation exchanged United States cotton for British rub-
ber. Considering the fact that the government subsequently
had to purchase several billion dollars worth of materials, the
$22,000,000 spent in 1939-1940 was inadequate indeed. 6
If the close students of the problem had so inadequate a
view of the matter in 1934, at the time of the publication of
Mr. Emeny's book and, indeed, almost to the outbreak of this
war, it is not to be wondered that little progress was made.
As a matter of interest, I may say that I had put into the hands
of the State Department and the President, the latter even
before he came into office, proposals for stockpiling some of
these raw materials (particularly tin, chrome, and manga-
nese), 7 in return for at least a partial settlement of the war
debts. You may recall that in 1932 Mr. Hoover was asked to
5 Brooks Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials: A Study of America
in Peace and War, published under the auspices of the Harvard and Rad-
cliffe Bureau of International Research (Macmillan, 1934, 202 pp.).
8 Although the Army-Navy Munitions Board was authorized to spend
$100,000,000 by the Act of June 7, 1939, this was to be spread over the
period from 1939-1943 inclusive. Actually only $70,000,000 of this appropria-
tion was spent as follows: Public Act No. 361, 76th Congress (August 9,
1939) — $10,000,000; Public Act No. 442, 76th Congress (March 25, 1940)
— $12,500,000; Public Act No. 667, 76th Congress (June 26, 1940) —
$47,500,000.
'Memorandum from W. Y. Elliott to Secretary Hull, September 29,
1941, "Peace Settlement: Necessity for an agreement with the British, Free
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make a settlement of the war debts when his famous "mora-
torium" on the inter-allied war debt to us was about to expire.
Since his term was also about to expire, he invited Mr. Roose-
velt, the incoming President, to join in the settlement of this
problem. Mr. Roosevelt naturally felt a reluctance to undertake
negotiations at a time when he had no actual responsibility.
The whole episode further illustrates one of the grave diffi-
culties of getting a coherent policy, particularly a continuity
of policy, during the lapse of time between the defeat of an
outgoing President and the inauguration of a new one.
International Politics of Stockpiling
During the intervening years, I lost no opportunity with the
State Department and the President to press for a raw ma-
terials consideration in the settlement of the war debts. I took
the trouble to circulate almost a hundred mimeographed copies
of the proposal among influential British circles, but got very
little response beyond a denunciation from the Northcliffe
(now the Rothermere) press in England to the effect that this
was the worst possible solution of the war debt problem since
the debtors might actually have to pay something on the debt.
Many of the more serious comments from highly placed
British officials indicated that the solution was feasible, par-
ticularly as the production of these raw materials had dropped
to disastrous levels during the world depression. They all,
however, looked with grave misgivings on allowing the United
States to acquire stocks which might overhang the world
market and put the producers at the mercy of this govern-
ment, so far as future prices were concerned. At that good
moment, the British were charging us (as they did after the
establishment of the Tin Cartel by agreement between the
British, Bolivian, and Dutch governments) about one hundred
pounds sterling a ton too much for tin above the proper
market rate that to a moderate cost producer would have pro-
French, Dutch, and Belgians to apply Colonial Raw Materials as against
Lend-Lease Aid."
Memorandum from W. Y. Elliott to Secretary Hull, November 23, 1943,
"The Possibilities of Postwar Stockpiling of Strategic Materials as a
Method of Offsetting American Lend-Lease Aid and Obtaining Repayment
for Postwar Loans Abroad."
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vided a handsome profit. It is perhaps not to be wondered that
they looked with misgivings on settling any part of the war
debt by handing over stocks of the material in question. How-
ever, I have been informed that even during the '20's, the
Belgian government had proposed to settle its war debt
through payments in kind, particularly in radium. Since we,
however, did not on our part actively press the issue of having
the assets of the Colonial Empires on the table as a part of any
war debt settlement, nothing actually happened.
It would be indiscreet of me to mention the conferences
which I had with the President, and with many officials of the
State Department and others in high places, urging this solu-
tion prior to this war. The war debts had become a subject
loaded with political dynamite which many people thought it
best to forget, merely asserting a high theoretical claim to be
repaid in full. Some of the omniscient gentlemen who have
since written memoirs testifying to their infallibility during
this period, to my certain knowledge, still held to the view that
we could somehow be paid either in gold or in currency in
spite of all the logic of the trade balances. They, therefore,
looked upon the idea of repayment through stockpiles of stra-
tegic materials as unnecessary. Almost in desperation then, I
published these views both in England and in this country8 and
gave some attention to the problem, though in a very despair-
ing mood, in the book on International Control in the Non-
Ferrous Metals, which I edited. 9
Domestic Politics of Stockpiling
I have attempted to show some of the difficulties that arose
from the politics of foreign powers bent on protecting their
economic interests as they saw them, and other difficulties
arising from our own State Department's policy, handicapped
by fear of raising dangerous political issues. But by far the
most important political stymie to adequate stockpiling of
8
"War Debts and Peace Credits," Political Quarterly, April, 1933
;
"Joint Policy for Britain and the U.S.A.," Political Quarterly, April, 1938;
Fortnightly 147 (n.s. 141), June, 1937; "Time for War," Virginia Quarterly
Review, Vol. 17, No. 4, October, 1941.
9 W. Y. Elliott, C. S. May, J. W. F. Rowe, Alex Shelton, and D. Wal-
lace, International Control in the Non-Ferrous Metals (Macmillan, 1937,
801 pp.).
{22}
minerals from foreign sources rose from our own domestic
producers. We produced in 1940 at a high tariff premium only
40,000 tons of domestic manganese ore (containing 35 per
cent manganese), employing at its peak only at the most a few
thousand miners, whereas our wartime imports of manganese
have run consistently above a million tons and our total con-
sumption in war approaches 1,400,000 tons a year. The larger
manganese deposits in this country are, with rare exceptions,
of low grade and have to be blended with high grade foreign
imports in order to satisfy the metallurgical standards for
steel operations.
What was true of manganese was true also of chrome of
the metallurgical grades, though we did have sizeable deposits
of chrome and of chemical and refractory grade ore which
had been neglected, partly because of price reasons, during
this period. We were fortunately the world's largest producer
of molybdenum, which is substitutable in a wide range of
uses for tungsten, and we produced perhaps 50 per cent of
our tungsten requirements for war purposes. Our domestic
bauxite had very limited high grade reserves of ore, not more
than three to four years' use at the present rate, which have
been sadly depleted in any case during the course of this war.
We had many years' reserves of low grade bauxite, but no
feasible process for utilizing this at the outbreak of the war,
nor had we taken steps to develop processes for using alunite
and clay. The problem of magnesium turned into one of
facilities rather than raw material sources, since it can be made
under modern processes from brine and salt water and the
latter, in the seas, is quantitatively about the most unlimited
mineral on this planet.
However, we did not possess any sizeable production of the
most important minerals, as mica, for example, which is used
for all sorts of electrical insulation and spark plugs for many
types of aircraft; or steatite talc, the proper grades of which
for use in condensers in radio tubes and other equally im-
portant purposes come only from India and Sardinia
;
graphite
for crucibles, coming only from Madagascar and Ceylon, on
which depended a great part of the metal industry; industrial
diamonds, which are absolutely essential to cutting operations
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in many types of mining; abrasives as corundum, for which
the domestic substitutes have seemed to be inadequate; and
quartz crystals, which were absolutely essential to the whole
aircraft industry as well as to the radio and radar industries.
Rare metals like tantalum, columbite, osmiridium, and plat-
inum have given us difficulties in keeping supply even a few
weeks ahead of requirements and have had to be flown from
the sources of procurement at times when we very badly
needed the planes for other uses. Nor is this list of strategic
minerals in which the United States is deficient at all com-
plete. We had to fly tungsten out of China, and steatite talc
from India. We were desperately dependent upon antimony
from the West Coast of South America, and upon lead and
copper from both South America and Africa. Lead and zinc,
too, had to come from Australia in as large quantities as we
could procure and ship them.
During the prewar period, the domestic producers of these
metals, notably lead, zinc, copper, and tungsten, were naturally
reluctant to see large stocks imported from abroad. They
shared the same fears that producers abroad did of the de-
pressing effects of these stocks on the market. Wartime has
always afforded a bonanza to mineral producers of marginal
properties in the United States. They do not look forward
with any eagerness to a curtailment of the chances of realizing
on long idle investments in mines.
It is fair to add, on the other side, that domestic mining
as a small scale proposition has often proved less attractive
to the large companies than has the importation of foreign
metals. In some instances, domestic reserves have been left
inadequately explored, and certainly not adequately exploited.
From a conservation angle, it can always be argued that the
best protection of our natural resources is to leave them in the
ground. But it is also true that the time involved in opening
them for exploitation and for discovering new sources, may
be the critical factor at issue.
The Act of June 7, 1939 (Public Act No. 117), fathered
by Senator Thomas of Utah, established a fund of $100,000,-
000 against which purchases of strategic materials could be
made, and also provided for the expenditure of an additional
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$2,000,000 through the Bureau of Mines and the Geological
Survey for the exploration and geological testing of domestic
resources. Furthermore, safeguards were thrown around the
procurement of these materials, either from foreign or do-
mestic sources, by insuring that they could be released only on
the President's specific authorization at the instance of the
Army-Navy Munitions Board. This was intended to protect
producers from having stockpiles in the hands of the govern-
ment that could be used for purposes of price manipulation.
The so-called ''Mineral Bloc" in Congress, which had up to
that time opposed the import of foreign metals under the able
leadership of Congressman, now Senator, Scrugham of
Nevada, therefore accepted a compromise by which some de-
velopment of domestic minerals went along with foreign
procurement. This pattern clearly establishes the lines of
politically feasible stockpiling policy on a postwar basis if
it is to be undertaken. The domestic interest will have to be
given what it regards as a fair share of the over-all procure-
ment of stockpile materials. The difficulty will be to see that
that is kept within the bounds of an economically feasible pro-
gram and not be carried out in the tenor of the proposed stock-
piling bills— e.g., the Scrugham Bill, which has been intro-
duced (though not yet passed), to limit future stockpiling of
many strategic metals to domestic producers as far as possible.
Legislation Proposed for Postwar Stoc\jpiling
The Army and the Navy are interested in stockpiles primarily
for military security. Other interests are concerned with pro-
tecting their own position as producers. The Scrugham Bill
was designed primarily "to stimulate the current production
of domestic strategic and critical minerals from small or
marginal mines by assuring them a measure of economic post-
war security." 10 It was also aimed at encouraging "the postwar
operation of small or marginal mineral deposits in the con-
tinental United States and Alaska and of the beneficiation and
processing adjunct thereto" and at avoiding "the widespread
10 Senate Bill 1160, 78th Congress, 1st Session, June, 1943. This was
not passed. A subsequent Scrugham Bill, Senate Bill 1582, was introduced
on December 8, 1943. This bill also did not pass.
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economic distress and failure of small or marginal mine own-
ers, operators, and related enterprise which followed World
War I." The remainder of the Bill, it is true, provided for
setting up a Stockpile Advisory Committee whose duty it
would be to estimate the stockpiling requirements that would
protect the country against future emergencies and wars, and
to set up the Metals Reserve Company as the agency for
carrying out the purposes of the Bill. The Bill, however, was
quite clear in its intention to subordinate the importation of
foreign ores to the production from domestic ore and to pro-
vide relief for those miners who had been operating marginal
properties during the war. It did not succeed in passing, at
least partly because of the opposition of the State Department
and of the Foreign Economic Administration.
When one reflects that minerals are widely scattered over
the surface of the entire United States and that the Mining
Bloc at the peak of its power contained perhaps 250 members
of the Houses, with a very strong representation in the Senate,
one can understand the political aspects of attempting to pro-
vide for imports from abroad that conflict with these interests.
The power of the Mining Bloc would require no other evidence
of its strength than the passage of the silver legislation under
which this country has labored for many years. I believe it
would be difficult to find even one economist of any national
reputation who would have supported the form taken by the
silver legislation, and it is generally always possible to find at
least one outstanding economist in the country who will stand
for anything.
At the time this bill was introduced, the War Production
Board was asked for an opinion, and as at that time I was in
charge of Stockpiling and Transportation for the Board, I was
asked to send a letter on this subject to Senator Scrugham. 11
For present purposes, I will merely quote one or two points
developed in the letter.
The stockpiling features of the Bill, insofar as they provide
for a small representative committee which will make surveys and
determine a stockpile plan for after the war, to protect us against
the deficiencies which we discovered in this war, we heartily ap-
11 See Appendix II.
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prove. We feel, however, that such a stockpiling plan should not
be limited, as the Bill under consideration proposes to do, to
minerals only; it should cover all the materials and commodities
which our experience in this war has shown are necessary in the
conduct of a war.
Furthermore, we believe that domestic materials should
not mandatorily be given a preferred position over foreign ma-
terials in all cases. In many cases it will be wise to encourage
domestic production by stockpile purchases. In others, however,
our domestic supply may be so limited as to make it highly de-
sirable to conserve such supplies in the ground and to build our
stockpiles through foreign purchases and imports. In the post-
war readjustment period it may be necessary, also, to accept
foreign materials in settlement of obligations. The persons
charged with the responsibility of administering the stockpile
program should not, in our opinion, be unnecessarily restricted
as to the kinds or sources of the stockpile materials.
Other government agencies than the War Production
Board and the Army-Navy Munitions Board are interested
in prospective stockpile legislation. The Bureau of Mines of
the Department of the Interior has always had a very close
connection with the mineral industry of this country and the
Department of the Interior has regularly been included in
stockpiling considerations and in proposed measures for estab-
lishing a stockpiling authority.
There is no doubt that the proper exploration of our
mineral resources and the encouragement of exploratory de-
velopment is a necessary part of any stockpiling activity. In
many cases, private interests with large foreign holdings have
not been anxious to develop domestic resources even to the
degree of determining the extent of the ore deposits and the
feasibility of using them during war. Against this tendency,
both the Mining Congress and the Bureau of Mines, and for
that matter, the Mineral Bloc in Congress, have had legitimate
grievances which will certainly get recognition in any legisla-
tion that is passed. A subsidy program for a properly approved
maintenance of existing facilities in at least a stand-by condi-
tion, and for the further exploration of our natural resources
is certainly likely to find a place in any future stockpiling
legislation. Technical research and pilot plants to develop the
use of domestic materials are both needed.
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But the necessity of drawing on outside sources to sup-
plement the domestic resources of the United States is clearly
indicated in the interests of national conservation as well as
of national security. Senator Lodge, in a significant speech in
the Senate on June 18, 1943, put this in very strong terms in
pointing out that "we are actually facing the prospect of an
America naturally depleted of some of its magnificent natural
resources." The State Department called this to the attention
of the committee considering the Scrugham Bill during the
course of its hearings and made very strong representations
against limiting the procurement of foreign materials in any
such way as would be provided by that Bill. The Mining and
Metallurgical Society, in addition to urging that all "stocks
of minerals and metals which, at the end of the war, may be
in the possession or under the control of government or sub-
sidiary agencies thereof be retained as defensive reserves under
the jurisdiction of the Army or Navy," opposed the Bill so
far as the extension of existing and new contracts was con-
cerned for the production of minerals and metals under quota
premiums or bonus prices. They urged that such a step would
have the effect of "exhausting the reserves of such minerals
which should rather be conserved for use in emergencies
which may hereafter arise."
These brief extracts from the testimony on the Scrugham
Bill indicate an interesting alignment that goes, not only into
the realm of minerals, but into all questions of imports from
abroad. 12 Marginal domestic producers naturally are interested
in a protectionist policy and, in effect, in subsidies by the gov-
ernment to continue those operations. The same problem arises
in food production and, for that matter, manufacturing in
many lines. The mineral producers are far from being unique
in urging subsidies or tariffs because of higher labor costs.
Their position does differ, however, in that the reserves of
materials once taken from the ground can never be replaced.
Many of -the products into which they enter are dissipated
forever during wartime. The scrap which is recovered, for-
midable as it is in volume, tends to disappear in the course
of years as it is absorbed in the stream of production.
12 See Hearings Before a Sub-Committee of the Senate Committee on
Mines and Mining, 70th Congress, 1st Session, on Senate Bill 1160, June
24, July I and 2, 1943.
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Balance Sheet of United States Resources
of Strategic Materials
Let us look, therefore, at the balance sheet of the strategic
materials of the United States at the end of this war, in order
to see how important it is that we should establish a stockpiling
operation that will restore in some measure our depleted re-
serves and create other reserves against future contingencies
that may arise.
There is no shortage of coal. The coal reserves of this
country fortunately are adequate for an indefinite future, at
very much expanded rates of use.
Petroleum is being rapidly pumped out of the ground, but
the progress of petroleum technology in extracting oil and gas
has advanced consistently for so many years the point at
which a predicted exhaustion would be reached that the public
is now skeptical of any such prediction. Nevertheless, it is a
truism that the reserves of petroleum are far from inex-
haustible, even in as richly an endowed country as is the
United States. The interests of conservation on a national
scale would certainly demand that we cease producing so much
of our staggering requirements for this fuel within our own
borders and draw more on outside reserves such as those of
Venezuela and the Middle East. Shale oil will be a possibility
for an indefinite period when petroleum costs in the rest of the
world permit the economic exploitation of our tremendous
reserves of this higher cost method of production. Of course,
at a price, petroleum can always be produced from coal itself.
Iron ore, another basic natural source of any modern
industry, still exists in very large reserve tonnages in the
United States, but the high grade ore reserves of the Lake
Superior region have been sadly depleted by the almost one
hundred million ton mining schedules that have had to be met
during the war years. Lower grade reserves exist, which with
proper treatment and at increased cost can be used for many
years to come, but the cream of the Lake Superior ore will be
skimmed off shortly after 1950. In the alloying materials and
nonferrous metals, we have tremendous reserves of molyb-
denum, but our reserves of tungsten have been heavily tapped.
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The Bingham District of Utah contains most of the high
grade copper left in the United States that is reasonably low-
cost, and we have had to import copper for war uses at the
rate of over six hundred thousand tons a year. Mexico and
the West Coast of South America are rich not only in copper
but also in antimony, but our own deposits are scanty and do
not afford adequate reserves. Lead has been mined out of our
richer deposits to an appalling degree, and we shall in a
measurably few years approach the exhaustion of the richest
veins and fall back upon much more costly production. Zinc
is in much the same state.
Canada contains the greatest nickel deposits in the world,
and we have opened up subsidiary deposits in Cuba, so that
under normal conditions, we should have no particular worry
on this score. For metallurgical chrome, however, the Cuban
deposits, mostly of refractory grade, are not adequate and our
own are very scanty indeed. We do have probably adequate
chemical chrome, except for certain grades that appear to
have to come from South Africa. If we hold the Philippines
in the future, we should, of course, have some access to this
source for much refractory and some metallurgical and
chemical chromes, though it lies at a perilous distance from
home and proved not to be safe in this war.
Apart from the Cuban and Brazilian manganese, which
between them would furnish a considerable amount of our
manganese requirements, we have no nearby safe deposits,
and our own domestic manganese is woefully inadequate. It
has been found necessary for metallurgical purposes to import
very large amounts of Indian and West African manganese
ore to bring up the manganese from other sources to the ap-
propriate quality. Lost efficiency in steel production results
unless this is done. In the minor metals and minerals, our
mercury deposits have been sadly depleted by this war, though
those of Mexico probably are still quite extensive. 13
Our greatest weakness lies in quartz crystals, industrial
diamonds, mica, graphite, tantalite, columbite, corundrum,
13 Mexico and Canada have supplied large amounts of lead and zinc, and
smaller amounts of copper. Under reasonable conditions, both countries could
be counted on in wartime to supply these metals, and possibly iron ore. But
reasonable conditions do not always follow wars.
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and cobalt. There are deposits of nearly all these minerals or
metals in limited amounts within the continental bounds of
North America. They are, however, so scattered and so limited
and of such a difference in grades that it is not safe to count
on any of them without very large imports from abroad. The
graphite of Alabama, for example, which is a possible substi-
tute for foreign graphite, reduces the efficiency of crucibles to
such a point as to be very wasteful of manpower and of other
materials. The same thing may be said of the mica deposits of
this country, though they undoubtedly are capable of con-
tributing in a last ditch emergency far more than they have
done in this war. Strategic grades of these materials must be
counted upon from imports, and it is much better to do the
importing before a war rather than during a war if we have
any regard for our future national safety. Substitution is
possible for many uses, but with loss of efficiency and pro-
duction.
We shall never again be dependent upon crude rubber from
abroad to the extent that we were during this war, because of
our development of synthetic plants, which will certainly not
be scrapped in favor of a complete return to crude rubber.
Cryolite, an essential catalytic agent for aluminum production,
nearly all came from Greenland. Now it has a synthetic sub-
stitute from fluorspar that is acceptable to industry. We have
ceased to be vulnerable there. The same thing is true within
some limits of our former dependence on Chile for nitrates.
We still require Chilean nitrates for some purposes in agri-
culture, but we could go on a reasonably self-sufficient basis,
were it necessary to do so, because of the tremendous advance
in the production of synthetic nitrates from our nitrogen
plants.
In* most chemicals, the same story of growing freedom
from foreign imports may be told. We have largely rid our-
selves since World War I of dependence on imports in this
field. However, it is still doubtful whether there is a complete
substitute for materials such as quinine in the field of drugs.
Rotenone and pyrethrum are insecticides which do not seem
to be supplanted by even the miracles of DDT. There have
been times when our agricultural production required the
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flying of rotenone from South America, and of pyrethrum
from East Africa. A constant eye has to be kept on supplies
of such materials.
Nor would it be wise to forget the fibers. Nylon has proved
to be an extremely effective substitute for silk in practically
all war uses, but we still have had to import large amounts of
Egyptian long staple cotton to make some of our most essen-
tial war materials. No one has yet been able to find, on an
adequate commercial scale, a proper substitute for sisal from
East Africa and abaca (manila fiber) from the Philippines.
The rich plantations of the latter fiber, which we have set up in
Central America, may prove to be commercially feasible as a
competitor for the Far Eastern fiber, but that is not yet certain.
The growth of American hemp crops at very high prices
simply tided us over a very difficult situation when there was
a shortage of other fibers for rope so necessary for naval and
merchant marine operations.
The fact that we were able in this war to retain all our
sources of supply of wool, not only from Australia and the
Argentine, but even from South Africa, should not blind us to
the fact that we are far from self-sufficient in our wool pro-
duction during wartime emergencies. Nevertheless, it seems
unlikely that we should at any time be cut off from sources of
wool supply to a degree that would make necessary the build-
ing of large reserve stocks of this material in the future.
There are, however, many other things, as sheepskin shear-
lings and leather rawstocks, which we have appeared to need
in very much larger volume for war than we can produce
even though they are not suitable materials for stockpiling. A
long position in them would be safe from the point of view of
national policy. It is quite conceivable that these items, as well
as the others, ought to have some revolving stockpile estab-
lished as a measure of adequate protection in troubled times. 14
However,- in a period of such world shortage (reflecting pent-
up demand) as we shall undoubtedly enter following the
conclusion of peace, it would be expedient to postpone the
14 A revolving stockpile, such as that established for rubber, rotates and
turns over the stocks in order to prevent their physical deterioration.
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accumulation of such scarce stocks until the shortage has been
somewhat relieved.
Many of the fats and oils also present special problems.'
Considerable reserves of palm oil appear to be necessary for
the operation of many industrial facilities, such as tin plating.
In general, the fats and oils position of this country is capable
of being well-nigh self-sufficient in a well-planned agricultural
program, as we found when we were cut off from our major
supplies of copra and cocoanut oil. At most, revolving stock-
piles of rather limited quantities in this area would be all that
would be needed. We have not quite gone to the extent of
stockpiling horse feathers during the war, but combinations
of actual items almost suggest that fantastic position. Goose
feathers and horse hair, as well as cattle tail hair, have been
very important parts of the war program and have been
publicly purchased. It is astonishing what a range of materials
the country has to draw upon in order to equip the tremendous
armies that we have put into the field, both for ourselves and
our Allies.
Despite the wide range of strategic material deficits in the
United States, it is, however, in the lack of minerals that our
greatest threat to security lies.
Stoc\piling for Peace and Economic Security
Now what bearing has all this on peace, when we presumably
will cease to think about wars, at least for the immediate
future ?
In the first place, there will be the old question of getting
some repayment for our Lend-Lease operations, which under
the terms of the original agreements spoke of payments in kind
where the return of the original materials was not possible.
Certainly as a part of any such settlements, we should ask for
naval and air bases and the control of strategic territories
necessary to the operation of our new position both in air and
in sea power. We should also, it seems to me, at the very least,
demand some pooling of the world's strategic materials inso-
far as they exist in colonial territories. Is it too much to
remind our Allies that we have re-established them in the
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possession of these territories? Even if it turns out by the
arrangements to be made at San Francisco that there is an
international type of regime of trusteeships contemplated for
the control of colonial territories in certain regions of the
world, the question of the ownership of the raw materials
therein will arise. I should not rule out, in return for Lend-
Lease, taking over actual possession of these assets, but I
should think we certainly have a minimum right to joint
voting control in the holding companies, voting trusts, or other
pooling arrangements that are set up between nations for their
control. It is unthinkable that we should not be a member of
any arrangements dealing with the world production of tin in
the future, to name only one instance, since tin occurs in such
limited amounts in the United States that its production
abroad is of primary interest to us. We are the greatest con-
sumers of tin, by far. The same thing may also be said of
manganese, chrome, and several other minerals.
But the major interest for peacetime stockpiling will lie,
not alone in the rate of development or in policies as to price
and production pursued through international agreements, but
in the possibility of being repaid for some of our postwar
loans through the acquisition of minerals, more permanently
valuable to us than gold. Instead of acquiring a stockpile of
gold sterilized as our present stockpile is, would it not have
been infinitely more valuable to have had a stockpile of these
strategic materials? I think it is demonstrable that we should
expect to have, from the surplus production that is possible in
the world, over and above commercial needs, a return of at
least $200,000,000 a year from the import of the world's
surplus production of strategic materials which we can hardly
acquire in too large amounts for security purposes. It may
seem fantastic to add petroleum to the repayment proposal,
but the obviously sound policy is to conserve our own petro-
leum reserves in the ground within the United States and to
import cheaper petroleum from abroad for commercial pur-
poses. The politics of petroleum, however, will probably not
permit us to follow this enlightened policy, under conditions
of fact. If we must pump out our oil from our own reserves,
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we could actually import petroleum from abroad and put it back
in naval reserves in selected geological formations at prices not
substantially greater than the production of petroleum would
be in this country. Recoveries of up to 97 or 98 per cent of the
oil put back into the ground are now commercially feasible and
have been attained in practice. This might be a very large item
in the repayment of foreign loans, particularly those made for
developmental purposes. Oil imports are capable of running to
several hundred millions of dollars a year.
I am suggesting frankly that we need to export anywhere
from eight to twelve billions of dollars a year (at present price
levels of 1945) ; and that for a period of time during the re-
covery of the world, we can probably not import for private
trade and current consumption from available sources of raw
materials and foreign manufacture more than five to six bil-
lion dollars a year at the outside. Tourist expenditures and
invisible items may add up to another billion. We shall have
several billion dollars at least in the way of a so-called favor-
able trade balance that we need to make up on a long-time
import policy. Five hundred millions a year in stockpile im-
ports for government account from world surplus production
applied to payment of interest and amortization of loans would
go a long way toward establishing this balancing factor during
the immediate postwar years. Stockpiling, therefore, might
serve as a great stabilizing factor in the world's economy and
a particularly beneficial one in our own. It would help to pre-
vent a disastrous slump in the mineral producing countries
which the war has brought to such high levels, after the first
years of postwar scarcity.
Stated in the simplest terms, since there will not be goods
available from private imports, quite apart from any con-
siderations of tariffs, in sufficient volume for the first years
after the war, we need to find a long-term program of special
imports which will permit us to make loans during this period
for the reconstruction of the world. This will be necessary if
only to keep the heavy industries, particularly the capital goods
industries, of this country on a high plateau which will enable
us to carry our present debt structure without inflation. The
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capital goods industries are the bellwethers of business cycles.
They affect transportation and everything else. They are the
ones that will mainly benefit from a large export program
which can only be facilitated by loans, a great part of them
necessarily public loans. The only way that I can see that we
can be repaid for these loans is to take on a long-range stock-
piling policy which would accept surpluses of world produc-
tion of the basic minerals to restore our reserves in this
country and to build up some reserves of those that we do not
have inside our own borders. Instead of importing as we did
between the last two wars many billion dollars of gold which
we sterilized, we should import and sterilize by agreements
with the producing countries, over at least a twenty-year
period, as large amounts of these basic minerals as we are able
to take at reasonable prices. Appendix III will show that im-
ports from foreign surplus, exclusive of petroleum, are not
likely to run over $200,000,000 a year. 15 If petroleum can be
added, we might readily reach a $500,000,000 figure per
annum, which would permit the payment of a low interest
rate, say 2 per cent, and the amortization of the loans at a
rate of perhaps 4 per cent a year on very sizeable loans to
be made in the first few years after the war for repayment
within a twenty-year period. These reserves would always be
available for emergency use in war, but would otherwise not
be released for commercial account, prior to the expiration
of the twenty-year period, and then only in amounts agreed
upon by treaty with the producing nations in the termination of
contracts.
Without a substantial import on government account of
this character, we shall not be able, on any of the figures I
have seen, to hope for a balancing of our import program
that would permit the repayment of the loans, which we shall
certainly have to make in our own interest, as well as for the
reconstruction of the world. It can be summed up simply by
saying that it is better to get strategic minerals back which
will not depreciate in value in the future, even though we lose
the interest, rather than to take gold which equally bears no
interest. The alternative is to get nothing.
15 See Appendix III.
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One may hope that the arrangements made at San Fran-
cisco in setting up the Economic and Social Council that is to
function as part of the United Nations machinery on the peace
settlements will provide for the pooling of many colonial assets
for the purposes of their development and control. It is essen-
tial, however, that if we are to make loans as a nation and to
take a larger share in underwriting the obligations of the
Bretton Woods agreements that we should be able to be paid
back in some form. While I do not discount the possibilities
that world trade in a few years may assume proportions that
will make possible some real balancing of our imports against
exports, I am sure that for the immediate postwar period this
will not be the case. I think even the most sanguine proponents
of a low tariff policy resulting in our taking goods from all
the world, would not claim that we are likely to obtain more
imports than we have exports for a very long period in the
future. I must express my own personal skepticism, given the
past behavior of this nation as a creditor, that we shall ever
be willing to take amounts through private trade that would
keep this balance by importing more than we export. Farmers
are too articulate to permit it to be done in foodstuffs ; manu-
facturers are rooted in their convictions that they must not
permit competition from countries with low wage standards.
My hope is that the miners of the country, if we can protect
their interests by small scale purchases from them as part of
the domestic stockpiling program, will not object to "steri-
lized" reserve stockpiles, the building of which are clearly in
the national interest and long-run security. After all, every
civilization has been, in the last analysis, a metallurgical civili-
zation, ever since the legends of primitive times about the de-
cline of men from a golden age through a silver age to a
bronze and iron age. No nation will ever make a mistake by
having within its own borders the easily stored and nondeteri-
orating stocks of mineral wealth which are the world's most
real and permanent assets.
Is it too much to hope that we may join to an enlightened
political settlement, through the establishment of a machinery
of international cooperation for security purposes and a world
court of justice, a practicable machinery making it possible for
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this nation to play its role in the reconstruction of the world ?
In my view, we can only do so if we can convince the people
of this country that we are not continuing to give away our
own national assets without the prospect of a real return. A
return in kind through stockpiling appears to me to be the
most feasible method of underpinning the Bretton Woods
agreements by making it possible for this country to import
beyond the limits of the probable.
We ought to remember, too, that in the postwar world
we shall be dealing with economies that are more and more
controlled by governments. It is not alone that Russia, and
the states that will undoubtedly group themselves around
Russia, belong to the category of state capitalist economies.
Britain is being forced in that direction by the exhaustion of
her private capital loans abroad and by the necessity of mobi-
lizing the assets of her Empire under public control. France
and the liberated countries of Europe are equally being im-
pelled toward policies of nationalization and state control. We
must, on our part, have a machinery that will permit us to deal
with these nations without pitting private traders against
state subsidized and state controlled trade, and which will
permit public loans to supplement the flow of private invest-
ment. After the experience of the twenties, private investors
are not likely to be so eager to rush into any areas where the
risks of reconstruction jeopardize prospects of repayment.
The high interest rates that are associated with such risks
have a depressing effect on the prospect of sound recovery.
Only the state can operate in this area, painful as that con-
clusion is. It seems to me to be one which we must accept
and make workable through learning to operate a government
fit for the job that lies ahead and for the great role that
America must play in the world of the future.
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APPENDIX I
TIMETABLE OF STOCKPILING LEGISLATION
i. Preliminary studies on stockpile requirements undertaken
by War and Navy Departments in 192 1.
2. Appointment of the National Resources Board in 1933. Its
Planning Committee for Mineral Policy recommended the ac-
quisition of stockpiles of deficient minerals.
3. President asked the War Department to make detailed
recommendations for stockpiling in 1935.
4. Congress asked the Navy Department to make detailed
recommendations for stockpiling in 1936.
5. The 1938 Naval Appropriations Act (approved April 27,
1937) provided a statutory basis for stockpiling and authorized
the expenditure of $3,500,000 therefor.
6. Naval appropriations for the fiscal years 1939 and 1940
provided $500,000 per annum for the acquisition of strategic
stocks. Tin, manganese, tungsten, chrome, optical glass, and
manila fiber were purchased.
7. In 1 938- 1 939, the Army-Navy Munitions Board and the
Interior Department presented recommendations on stockpiling
to Congress.
8. Public Act No. 117, June 7, 1939, provided $100,000,000
for the acquisition of strategic and critical materials by the Army-
Navy Munitions Board.
9. Act of August 11, 1939, authorized the Commodity Credit
Corporation to exchange agricultural commodities produced in
the United States for stocks of strategic and critical materials
produced abroad.
10. Act of June 25, 1940 (Public Act No. 664), gave the Re-
construction Finance Corporation broad powers to acquire stra-
tegic and critical stockpiles on the authorization of the War
Production Board and other government agencies.
11. From August, 1941, to August, 1943, the Office of Pro-
duction Management and its successor, the War Production
Board, maintained stockpile objectives on a three-year emergency
supply basis. It was not possible to attain this goal.
12. From August, 1943, to February, 1944, the War Produc-
tion Board reduced its stockpile objectives to a one year's
emergency supply basis. This was a more realistic goal. It was
also reduced as an assurance to industry that large stockpiles
would not overhang the postwar market.
13. In February, 1944, the War Production Board revised its
stockpile objectives to "three months' total requirements or one
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year's requirements, less anticipated North American production,
whichever was higher."
14. Public Act No. 457, October 3, 1944 (Surplus Property
Act of 1944), contained a provision for transferring surplus gov-
ernment owned strategic and critical materials to the Treasury
Procurement Division for incorporation in its stockpiles estab-
lished pursuant to the Act of June 7, 1939.
15. See Appendix IV for text of Public Act No. 520, July 23,
1946, which contains present legal provisions for stockpiling.
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APPENDIX II
WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.
June 17, 1943
Honorable James G. Scrugham
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.
Dear Senator Scrugham:
At Mr. Batt's request I have reviewed the proposed Minerals
Stock Pile Act, S. 1160, with Mr. Howard Young. The follow-
ing comments represent our joint views. If the official views of
the War Production Board are desired at any future time, I
presume we shall hear further.
The bill as drawn appears to cover two general objectives:
(1) Aid for the domestic producer of minerals through taking
over of Government minerals stock piles at the end of the war
by Metals Reserve Company and purchase of production after the
war on rather inflexible predetermined terms and conditions; and
(2) post-war stock-pile planning through a committee which will
have the duty of making surveys, determining a stock-pile pro-
gram for minerals, and then acquiring the minerals pursuant to
the program. It is our view that these two objectives do not need
to be joined together in the same bill, and, in fact, that by so
joining them, the scope of the stock-pile provisions is made too
limited.
We do not feel that from the viewpoint of increasing the pro-
duction of minerals for the war program it is necessary to have
the additional authority the bill purports to provide for aiding
the domestic-minerals producer. The present powers of the War
Production Board, as supplemented by those of the Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation and other federal agencies, are broad
enough to authorize the offering of price inducements and market
production to domestic-minerals producers where necessary to
encourage them to make every production effort; and, in fact, as
you know, such steps have been taken in a number of instances.
It is true that once the war is over such producers may have
trouble finding a market for their products, but their situation will
not be different in that respect from that of many other pro-
ducers of war materials outside of the mining industry. That is a
post-war problem of such magnitude that it requires careful study
and action on the basis of a comprehensive plan. The present bill
touches only a segment of our whole industrial system.
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The stock-piling features of the bill, insofar as they provide
for a small representative committee which will make surveys and
determine a stock-pile plan for after the war, to protect us against
the deficiencies which we discovered in this war, we heartily
approve. We feel, however, that such a stock-piling plan should
not be limited, as the bill under consideration proposes to do, to
minerals only; it should cover all the materials and commodities
which our experience in this war has shown are necessary in the
conduct of a war.
Furthermore, we believe that domestic materials should not
mandatorily be given a preferred position over foreign materials
in all cases. In many cases it will be wise to encourage domestic
production by stock-pile purchases. In others, however, our
domestic supply may be so limited as to make it highly desirable
to conserve such supplies in the ground and to build our stock
pile through foreign purchases and imports. In the post-war re-
adjustment period it may be necessary, also, to be in a position
to accept foreign materials in settlement of obligations. The per-
sons charged with the responsibility of administering the stock-
pile program should not, in our opinion, be unnecessarily re-
stricted as to the kinds or sources of the stock-pile materials.
Sincerely,
W. Y. Elliott, Director
Stock-Piling and Transportation
Division
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APPENDIX III
Estimates of Imports Into the United States That Could
Be Made on Government Account Over and
Above Commercial Imports
(Per annum Postwar)
W. Y. Elliott, April 20, 1945
Petroleum (all foreign
sources) $300,000,000
Manganese 25,000,000
Chrome 25,000,000
Tin 25,000,000
Nonferrous metals, to include
tungsten, antimony, copper,
lead, zinc, bauxite, and
lesser alloy metals 50,000,000
Miscellaneous precious metals
and rare minerals 25,000,000
Industrial diamonds 25,000,000
Fibers and crude rubber for re-
volving stockpiles 25,000,000 (2 years only)
Chemicals, including drugs for
revolving stockpile 10,000,000 (2 years only)
Total $510,000,000
The revolving stockpiles would not be available for continued
import on a long-term basis. After the first two years, the annual
amounts would be reduced to the minerals. If petroleum imports
proved to be impracticable, the other minerals might still run to
around $175,000,000 at 1945 prices, and correspondingly higher
at postwar prices (1947).
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APPENDIX IV 1
[Public Law 520— 79TH Congress]
[Chapter 590 —-2D Session]
[S. 752]
AN ACT
To amend the Act of June 7, 1939 (53 Stat. 811), as amended, relating to
the acquisition of stocks of strategic and critical materials for national
defense purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the
Act of June 7, 1939 (53 Stat. 811), as amended, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"That the natural resources of the United States in certain
strategic and critical materials being deficient or insufficiently de-
veloped to supply the industrial, military, and naval needs of the
country for common defense, it is the policy of the Congress and
the purpose and intent of this Act to provide for the acquisition
and retention of stocks of these materials and to encourage the
conservation and development of sources of these materials within
the United States, and thereby decrease and prevent wherever
possible a dangerous and costly dependence of the United States
upon foreign nations for supplies of these materials in times of
national emergency.
"Sec. 2. (a) To effectuate the policy set forth in section 1
hereof the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the
Secretary of the Interior, acting jointly through the agency of the
Army and Navy Munitions Board, are hereby authorized and
directed to determine, from time to time, which materials are
strategic and critical under the provisions of this Act and to de-
termine, from time to time, the quality and quantities of such
materials which shall be stock piled under the provisions of this
Act. In determining the materials which are strategic and critical
and the quality and quantities of same to be acquired the Secre-
taries of State, Treasury, Agriculture, and Commerce shall each
designate representatives to cooperate with the Secretary of War,
the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Interior in
carrying out the provisions of this Act.
"(b) To the fullest extent practicable the Secretary of War,
the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Interior,
acting jointly, shall appoint industry advisory committees selected
from the industries concerned with the materials to be stock piled.
It shall be the general function of the industry advisory com-
1 Inserted to bring present status of stockpiling authority up to date as
of publication.
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mittees to advise with the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the
Navy, and the Secretary of the Interior and with any agencies
through which they may exercise any of their functions under
this Act with respect to the purchase, sale, care, and handling of
such materials. Members of the industry advisory committees
shall receive a per diem allowance of not to exceed $10 for each
day spent at conferences held upon the call of the Secretary of
War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the In-
terior, plus necessary traveling and other expenses while so
engaged.
"Sec. 3. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the
Navy shall direct the Secretary of the Treasury, through the
medium of the Procurement Division of his Department, to—
"(a) make purchases of strategic and critical materials with
due regard to the objectives set forth in section 1 of this Act and
pursuant to the determinations as provided in section 2 hereof,
which purchases ( 1 ) shall be made, so far as is practicable, from
supplies of materials in excess of the current industrial demand
and (2) shall be made in accordance with title III of the Act of
March 3, 1933 (47 Stat. 1520), but may be made without regard
to section 3709 of the Revised Statutes. A reasonable time (not
to exceed one year) shall be allowed for production and delivery
from domestic sources and in the case of any such material avail-
able in the United States but which has not been developed
commercially, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the
Navy may, if they find that the production of such material is
economically feasible, direct the purchase of such material with-
out requiring the vendor to give bond;
"(b) provide for the storage, security, and maintenance of
strategic and critical materials for stock-piling purposes on mili-
tary and naval reservations or other locations, approved by the
Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy
;
"(c) provide through normal commercial channels for the re-
fining or processing of any materials acquired or transferred
under this Act when the Secretary of War and the Secretary of
the Navy deem such action necessary to convert such materials
into a form best suitable for stock piling, and such materials may
be refined, processed, or otherwise beneficiated either before or
after their transfer from the owning agency;
"(d) provide for the rotation of any strategic and critical
materials constituting a part of the stock pile where necessary to
prevent deterioration by replacement of acquired stocks with
equivalent quantities of substantially the same material with the
approval of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy;
"(e) dispose of any materials held pursuant to this Act which
are no longer needed because of any revised determination made
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pursuant to section 2 of this Act, as hereinafter provided. No such
disposition shall be made until six months after publication in the
Federal Register and transmission of a notice of the proposed
disposition to the Congress and to the Military Affairs Committee
of each House thereof. Such notice shall state the reasons for
such revised determination, the amounts of the materials proposed
to be released, the plan of disposition proposed to be followed, and
the date upon which the material is to become available for sale
or transfer. The plan and date of disposition shall be fixed with
due regard to the protection of the United States against avoid-
able loss on the sale or transfer of the material to be released and
the protection of producers, processors, and consumers against
avoidable disruption of their usual markets: Provided, That no
material constituting a part of the stock piles may be disposed of
without the express approval of the Congress except where the
revised determination is by reason of obsolescence of that material
for use in time of war. For the purposes of this paragraph a
revised determination is by reason of obsolescence if such deter-
mination is on account of (1) deterioration, (2) development or
discovery of a new or better material or materials, or (3) no
further usefulness for use in time of war.
"Sec. 4. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the
Navy shall submit to the Congress, not later than six months after
the approval of this Act, and every six months thereafter a
written report detailing the activities with respect to stock piling
under this Act, including a statement of foreign and domestic
purchases, and such other pertinent information on the admin-
istration of the Act as will enable the Congress to evaluate its ad-
ministration and the need for amendments and related legislation.
"Sec. 5. The stock piles shall consist of all such materials
heretofore purchased or transferred to be held pursuant to this
Act, or hereafter transferred pursuant to section 6 hereof, or
hereafter purchased pursuant to section 3 hereof, and not dis-
posed of pursuant to this Act. Except for the rotation to prevent
deterioration and except for the disposal of any material pursuant
to section 3 of this Act, materials acquired under this Act shall
be released for use, sale, or other disposition only (a) on order
of the President at any time when in his judgment such release
is required for purposes of the common defense, or (b) in time of
war or during a national emergency with respect to common de-
fense proclaimed by the President, on order of such agency as
may be designated by the President.
"Sec. 6. (a) Pursuant to regulations issued by the War
Assets Administration or its successor, every material determined
to be strategic and critical pursuant to section 2 hereof, which is
owned or contracted for by the United States or any agency
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thereof, including any material received from a foreign govern-
ment under an agreement made pursuant to the Act of March n,
1941 (55 Stat. 31), as amended, or other authority, shall be trans-
ferred by the owning agency, when determined by such agency
to be surplus to its needs and responsibilities, to the stock piles
established pursuant to this Act, so long as the amount of the
stock pile for that material does not exceed the quantities de-
termined therefor pursuant to section 2 hereof. There shall be
exempt from this requirement such amount of any material as
is necessary to make up any deficiency of the supply of such ma-
terial for the current requirements of industry as determined by
the Civilian Production Administration or its successor. There
shall also be exempt from this requirement (1) any material
which constitutes contractor inventory if the owning agency shall
not have taken possession of such inventory, (2) such amount
of any material as the Army and Navy Munitions Board deter-
mines (i) are held in lots so small as to make the transfer thereof
economically impractical; or (ii) do not meet or cannot economi-
cally be converted to meet, stock-pile requirements determined in
accordance with section 2 of this Act. The total material trans-
ferred to the stock piles established by this Act in accordance with
this section during any fiscal year beginning more than twelve
months after this Act becomes law shall not exceed in value (as
determined by the Secretary of the Treasury on the basis of the
fair market value at the time of each transfer) an amount to be
fixed by the appropriation Act or Acts relating to the acquisition
of materials under this Act.
"(b) Any transfer made pursuant to this section shall be made
without charge against or reimbursement from the funds avail-
able under this Act, except that expenses incident to such transfer
may be paid or reimbursed from such funds, and except that,
upon any such transfer from the Reconstruction Finance Corpo-
ration, or any corporation organized by virtue of the authority
contained in the Act of January 22, 1932 (47 Stat. 5), the Sec-
retary of the Treasury shall cancel notes of Reconstruction
Finance Corporation, and sums due and unpaid upon or in con-
nection with such notes at the time of such cancellation, in an
amount equal to the fair market value as determined by the Sec-
retary of the Treasury of the material so transferred.
"(c) Effective whenever the Secretary of the Treasury shall
cancel any notes pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the
amount of notes, debentures, bonds, or other such obligations
which the Reconstruction Finance Corporation is authorized and
empowered to have outstanding at any one time under the pro-
visions of existing law shall be deemed to be reduced by the
amount of the notes so canceled.
{47}
"(d) Subsection (b) of section 14 of the Act of October 3,
1944 (58 Stat. 765), is hereby amended to read as follows:
"
'(b) Subject only to subsection (c) of this section, any own-
ing agency may dispose of -
—
"
'(1) any property which is damaged or worn beyond
economical repair;
"
'(2) any waste, salvage, scrap, or other similar items;
"
'(3) any product of industrial, research, agricultural,
or livestock operations, or of any public works construction
or maintenance project, carried on by such agency;
which does not consist of materials which are to be transferred in
accordance with the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling
Act, to the stock piles established pursuant to that Act.'
"(e) Section 22 of the Act of October 3, 1944 (58 Stat. 765),
is hereby repealed: Provided, That any owning agency as defined
in that Act having control of materials that, when determined to
be surplus, are required to be transferred to the stock piles pur-
suant to subsection (a) hereof, shall make such determination as
soon as such materials in fact become surplus to its needs and
responsibilities.
"Sec. 7. (a) The Secretary of the Interior, through the Di-
rector of the Bureau of Mines and the Director of Geological
Survey, is hereby authorized and directed to make scientific, tech-
nologic, and economic investigations concerning the extent and
mode of occurrence, the development, mining, preparation, treat-
ment, and utilization of ores and other mineral substances found
in the United States or its Territories or insular possessions,
which are essential to the common defense or the industrial
needs of the United States, and the quantities or grades of which
are inadequate from known domestic sources, in order to deter-
mine and develop domestic sources of supply, to devise new
methods for the treatment and utilization of lower grade reserves,
and to develop substitutes for such essential ores and mineral
products; on public lands and on privately owned lands, with the
consent of the owner, to explore and demonstrate the extent and
quality of deposits of such minerals, including core drilling,
trenching, test-pitting, shaft sinking, drifting, cross-cutting, sam-
pling, and metallurgical investigations and tests as may be nec-
essary to determine the extent and quality of such deposits, the
most suitable methods of mining and beneficiating them, and the
cost at which the minerals or metals may be produced.
"(b) The Secretary of Agriculture is hereby authorized and
directed to make scientific, technologic, and economic investiga-
tions of the feasibility of developing domestic sources of supplies
of any agricultural material or for using agricultural commodities
for the manufacture of any material determined pursuant to
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section 2 of this Act to be strategic and critical or substitutes
therefor.
"Sec. 8. For the procurement, transportation, maintenance,
rotation, storage, and refining or processing of the materials to be
acquired under this Act, there is hereby authorized to be appro-
priated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise ap-
propriated, such sums as the Congress, from time to time, may
deem necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act. The funds
so appropriated, including the funds heretofore appropriated,
shall remain available to carry out the purposes for which appro-
priated until expended, and shall be expended under the joint
direction of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.
"Sec. 9. Any funds heretofore or hereafter received on ac-
count of sales or other dispositions of materials under the pro-
visions of this Act, except funds received on account of the
rotation of stocks, shall be covered into the Treasury as miscel-
laneous receipts.
"Sec. 10. This Act may be cited as the 'Strategic and Critical
Materials Stock Piling Act.' "
Approved July 23, 1946.
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DISPUTES BEFORE ORGANS OF
THE UNITED NATIONS 1
By Manley O. Hudson
Bemis Professor of International Law in the Harvard Law School and
formerly Judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice
I esteem it a great honor to be invited to participate in this
distinguished series of Edmund J. James Lectures on Gov-
ernment. The name of the foundation stirs in my memory
happy recollections of the University of Illinois in one of its
greatest periods. More than thirty years have passed since I
first visited Urbana and had opportunity to sense the way in
which the radiating influence of President James had justified
the great reputation of the University throughout the country.
Ever since that visit, I have felt a personal debt to President
James for the galaxy of outstanding men whom he called into
the country's service as members of its Faculty.
In that galaxy, the name of James Wilford Garner stands
out for me. An eminent scholar, an inspiring teacher, a gallant
fighter in the public interest, Garner held outstanding rank in
the field of international law for more than a quarter of a
century. I prize as a possession of a lifetime my warm friend-
ship with him, and I regard my presence here on this occasion
as a homage to his precious memory. If I could bring any
slight clarity to my subject tonight, I would attribute the con-
tribution to his influence— as fresh to me now as when he
was still active as my colleague, my guide, and my friend.
We find ourselves struggling today in the grip of the ideas
with which we lived through the six years of a second World
War. In the course of that experience, we came to exalt the
role of force in human affairs, we were obliged to surrender
to a power psychology, and we looked out upon a divided
world. Habits were formed of which we could not suddenly
divest ourselves, and I suspect that many of us may not
realize the extent to which they still color our thinking.
There were obvious advantages in our undertaking to
1 Delivered May 6, 1946.
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frame the Charter of the United Nations even before the end
of hostilities in Europe and in Asia. Unity was more easy to
achieve while a common danger still confronted so many
peoples, and the world needed that ray of hope to buoy its
spirit and its determination. As events have turned, it is for-
tunate that we have one great achievement before us, for
otherwise we are far from the new day for which men and
women everywhere were longing. The war is not yet ended—
our opponents in the struggle are still our enemies— destitu-
tion and starvation stalk rampant on a scale which the world
has never known before. Yet we have the Charter as a promis-
ing symbol of an eventual return to a greater sanity.
Along with the advantages, the promptitude with which
we undertook the framing of the Charter had also some dis-
advantages. Chief among them was that both in the conversa-
tions at Dumbarton Oaks and in the Conference at San
Francisco a war psychology was patently dominant. There was
no tolerance of neutrals— the attitude toward them was that
you are either with us or against us— and hence little dispo-
sition to make room for them in the organization of the world.
Emphasis was placed not on the law to be made ascendant,
but on the role of the powerful States insofar as they could
unite on keeping the peace.
I think this explains why it came about that the Charter
puts relatively little insistence on the pacific settlement of in-
ternational disputes. Great gains in this field had been reg-
istered in the inter-war years, but they are not reflected in the
Charter.
The Obligation of Pacific Settlement
I shall first deal with the general obligation of Members of the
United Nations to submit to the peaceful settlement of their
disputes. Perhaps one can say that such an obligation has been
assumed in the Charter. One of the announced purposes is "to
maintain international peace and security, and to that end:
... to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity
with the principles of justice and international law, adjust-
ment or settlement of international disputes . . . which might
lead to a breach of the peace." Both the Organization and its
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Members are to act in accordance with certain principles, one
of which is that "all Members shall settle their international
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international
peace and security, and justice, are not endangered." In
Article 33, it is said that
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely
to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,
shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, media-
tion, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to re-
gional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their
own choice.
This imposing enumeration of peaceful means is supplemented
by an obligation to "refer" certain disputes to the Security
Council when recourse to these means has failed. Article 52
adds that parties to regional arrangements "shall make every
effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through
such means . . . before referring them to the Security Coun-
cil." Certainly, these provisions have value, and their signifi-
cance in the Charter is not to be minimized. If they impose an
obligation, however, it is hardly greater than that imposed by
the Treaty for the Renunciation of War concluded at Paris in
1928, in which sixty-three States agreed that the settlement of
disputes of any nature should "never be sought except by
pacific means."
Standing alone, an obligation of pacific settlement is of
but limited value. It may create a psychological impulsion
for the State assuming it, it may serve as a useful peg
upon which insistence may be hung, it may supply a gauge
for the exercise of judgment when non-performance is alleged,
but it will not execute itself. Only when it is connected with
the functioning of a flesh-and-blood institution which is not
dominated by the State assuming it, is it likely to prove of
great effect. Only if specific powers are conferred upon a par-
ticular agency will the obligation be of much aid in a serious
emergency. I shall therefore confine what I have to say to the
functioning of the various organs of the United Nations upon
which a competence as to international disputes has been con-
ferred by the Charter— viz., the International Court of
Justice, the Security Council, and the General Assembly.
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The International Court of Justice
With respect to the International Court of Justice, the Charter
has fortunately preserved the Court created under the Statute
of 1920 without any material change either in its composi-
tion or in its procedure. It is of little importance that the
Permanent Court of International Justice has been re-chris-
tened the International Court of Justice, but some significance
does attach to the incorporation of the Statute in the Charter
as an integral part thereof. On the picture as a whole, it is
possible to say that, with little change of its character, the
pre-existing Court has been continued as an organ of the
United Nations. This had the great advantage of bringing to
the Court created in 1920 the support of certain States—
particularly, the United States of America— which had pre-
viously held aloof from it. To this extent, the action taken at
San Francisco is to be welcomed with enthusiasm. Insofar as
States may agree to submit their disputes, the Court stands
available as the competent organ for the administration of
justice according to international law.
Yet I think many people have been disappointed that the
continuity was carried so far that no progress was registered
at San Francisco with respect to the Court's jurisdiction.
When the Statute was being shaped at Geneva in 1920, there
was a stout insistence that the Court be invested with a meas-
ure of compulsory jurisdiction over defined categories of legal
disputes. This course had been suggested by the 1920 Com-
mittee of Jurists— indeed, it seemed but a natural develop-
ment of the action which had been taken at the Peace Confer-
ence held at The Hague in 1907, when unanimous agreement
was proclaimed on "the principle of compulsory arbitration"
and on the submission of certain types of disputes "to com-
pulsory arbitration without any restriction." Yet opinion was
sharply divided in 1920. Those who opposed compulsory
jurisdiction pleaded for "faith in the future," for letting time
do its work; as Mr. Politis put it, confidence in a tribunal
should come first. It was on these lines that the opposition
prevailed twenty-five years ago.
As a compromise, however, an optional provision was in-
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eluded in the Statute of 1920, under which States desiring to
do so could make declarations recognizing the Court's juris-
diction over four categories of legal disputes, with the result
that the Court might be seised of such a dispute between two
or more of the declaring States upon the application of one of
the parties. This proved over the years to be a most fruitful
provision. Progress under it was at first slow— though as
one would have expected, some of the smaller States such as
Denmark, Finland, Haiti, Netherlands, Norway, Panama,
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and Uruguay made declara-
tions very promptly. A new impetus came from the Locarno
Treaties in 1925, and it was augmented by the General Act
of Geneva in 1928. Within barely a decade, the obligatory
jurisdiction of the Court had thus been accepted by a large
number of States, including some of the more powerful States.
Of the fifty-two parties to the Statute, forty-six eventually
made declarations on varying terms as to duration and exclu-
sions, and at one moment the declarations of some forty-one
States were simultaneously in force. To this number may be
added that of the States which without making declarations
became parties to the Geneva General Act which also provided
for the Court's compulsory jurisdiction.
Here, then, was a development of the first magnitude for
international law. I venture to say that it was one of the most
significant legal developments of this century. In a number of
cases, the Court exercised the jurisdiction conferred, and with
no untoward incident in any case. So that the world actually
witnessed the spectacle of great States being called upon to
submit to the jurisdiction of a World Court, even though at
the time they may have been disposed to do otherwise.
No more impressive case can be cited in the history of
international adjudication than the Eastern Greenland Case
between Denmark and Norway in 1933. A vast territory was
claimed by both of the parties, and to each of them its posses-
sion and control seemed a matter of what we used to call
"vital interest." Yet both of the parties had accepted the
Court's compulsory jurisdiction, and when Denmark went to
The Hague and asked the Court to pronounce upon the con-
flicting claims, Norway did not demur; on the contrary, it
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promptly lent its cooperation by submitting to the Court an
application against Denmark. The fact is also notable that
when Norway lost the case, it proceeded without delay to give
effect to the Court's adverse judgment. I do not tire of citing
this whole proceeding as the outstanding example in interna-
tional annals of how great States should behave. It was the
high-water mark of the progress achieved under the Statute
of 1920.
On the record of what had been accomplished after 1920,
it is not surprising that many people looked to San Francisco
for the registration of some advance at the moment of the
revision of the Court's Statute. Every encouragement seemed
to exist for taking advantage of the lessons of twenty years,
and the ghastly trials of a second World War had engendered
a wide-spread conviction that the world was ready for bold
steps forward. Yet in spite of these facts, the United Nations
Conference did not meet these expectations. It left the matter
of the Court's jurisdiction precisely where it had been left in
1920. Though the representatives of a great majority of the
States favored a step in advance, the jurisdictional provi-
sions of the earlier Statute were preserved with no material
modification.
I think the reasons for this action are quite obvious. Two
States are chiefly responsible for the failure to go beyond the
ideas of 1920— the United States of America and the Soviet
Union— and it is a notable fact that neither of these States
had made any significant contribution to the development of
the law of pacific settlement inaugurated in 1920.
Insofar as the United States is concerned, its role is to be
attributed, not so much to the fact that our leaders were barely
cognizant of what had been achieved during the years of our
abstention, as to their impatience with legal forms and legal
restraints. For forty years, our Senate had insisted that the
United States should undertake no obligation to arbitrate
without stipulating that in each particular case a special agree-
ment should be concluded with the advice and consent of the
Senate, two-thirds of the Senators present concurring. In sea-
son and out of season, this insistence was repeated, and
though a few exceptions could be listed it was so successful
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that a Senatorial tradition grew out of it. The result was that
our Government was paralyzed in this field. It could not lend,
and it did not lend, any encouragement to the effort to extend
the reign of law by States' agreements to subject themselves
to the judicial settlement of their controversies by a fixed and
competent tribunal created in advance. Yet in spite of this fact,
we continued to profess our interest in pacific settlement ac-
cording to law, and to deem and to proclaim ourselves as the
leaders in that movement. At San Francisco, the Senate tradi-
tion so crippled our representatives that they felt themselves
bound to oppose any change in the jurisdictional features of
the 1920 Statute.
The position of the Soviet Union was in accord with our
own, but I think it had a more substantial and a more de-
fensible basis. In appraising Soviet policy, I suggest that we
may do well to keep in mind a history which is not too ancient
for ready recollection. The 19 17 revolution in Russia en-
countered a hostile reception in many other countries, and
even an organized effort to defeat its purposes. For some
years after the formation of the Soviet Union, its leaders were
not without some justification in their feeling that their coop-
eration with the rest of the world was not welcome. It was in
this period that their general attitude was formulated on the
pacific settlement of international disputes. When a simple
provision for arbitration was proposed at a conference at The
Hague in 1922, Mr. Litvinoff declared that there was no third
party to arbitrate between the Soviet world and the non-Soviet
world, and that "only an angel could be unbiased in judging
Russian affairs" from the outside. This policy was not modi-
fied in the course of the later rapprochement with Western
Europe. In consequence, the Soviet Union was not a party
to an arbitration with any other State, it made no arbitration
treaties with other States, and even after becoming a member
of the League of Nations it followed a pattern set by the
United States in making no use of the Permanent Court of
International Justice and in refraining from becoming a party
to its Statute. I think we can not appraise this record without
admitting the concordance of the Soviet practice and profes-
sions. The result was that at San Francisco the Soviet dele-
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gates saw eye to eye with the delegates of the United States
in opposing a change in the 1920 Statute.
Faced with the combined opposition of the two most pow-
erful States, it was impossible for the San Francisco Confer-
ence to go beyond the compromise of 1920. The Dumbarton
Oaks proposals had envisaged the incorporation of the Court
Statute in the Charter, and this course was more or less tacitly
agreed to. In consequence, the Statute of the Court had to be
so shaped that every member of the new United Nations
Organization could become a party to it. In the end, there-
fore, the provisions relating to jurisdiction were preserved as
they had been drafted in 1920. Thus each State retains an
option as to its acceptance of the Court's compulsory juris-
diction over its legal disputes.
The San Francisco Conference was not dealing with a
Court on paper, however. It assumed to carve out the future
of an existing institution, one which had proved itself to such
an extent that it had already become deeply embedded in the
world's treaty law. An extensive jurisdiction had been con-
ferred on it by various international instruments, many of
which were still in force. Insofar as the States which are
parties to these instruments are members of the United Na-
tions, that jurisdiction has not been lost by the modification of
the Court's Statute. Hence, the Court continues to have a con-
siderable jurisdiction, including that conferred by some
twenty-five States in acceptances of compulsory jurisdiction.
This situation presents a real challenge to the other Mem-
bers of the United Nations, including the United States, which
have not already accepted the Court's compulsory jurisdiction.
If they wish to expand the legal basis of international organi-
zation, if they desire a peace based on stable legal foundations,
these States should not long delay their acceptances. A unani-
mous voeu of the San Francisco Conference urged this course.
In the United States, two initiatives have already been
taken— one by Senator Morse of Oregon, and one by Repre-
sentative Herter of Massachusetts— in resolutions now pend-
ing in Congress. Under either resolution, the United States
would accept the Court's compulsory jurisdiction over the four
categories of legal disputes enumerated in Article 36 of the
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Statute, for a definite period of five years and thereafter until
the expiration of six months after notice of termination. The
Morse resolution presupposes action by the President with the
advice of two-thirds of the Senate; the Herter resolution
would require only a majority vote in each of the two Houses
of Congress. I believe you will share my feeling that after our
stand at San Francisco, early action on one of these lines by
the United States is an imperative of our good faith in the
professions which we have made of interest in a new world
order.
Categories of Disputes
While I can have no doubt that the general adoption of com-
pulsory Court jurisdiction over legal disputes would mean a
significant advance toward a peaceful world order, I am far
from thinking that this would constitute an adequate approach
by our generation to the problem of the pacific settlement of
disputes. Useful as they may be in many situations, judges on
the bench, operating within the severe limitations of the
judicial process, may not be the best persons to handle all of
the disputes which may arise. I should not want to fix too
rigidly the boundaries of what is adjudicable and what is not,
nor to set hard and fast categories of legal and non-legal dis-
putes. Yet I think a general distinction must be kept in mind,
and it must be appreciated that disputes may arise to which a
more useful approach can be made by a body operating with
greater freedom than a court, composed of men who are ac-
customed to dealing with currents of opinion, whose experi-
ence has trained them in the difficult art of adjusting oppos-
ing contentions, and whose authority at the moment enables
them to speak with imposing finality.
While I am generally distrustful of the use of analogies
drawn from national experience in discussions of international
problems, perhaps a useful analogy can here be drawn to our
manner of dealing with industrial disputes in national life.
Such disputes may have wide repercussions in a national
economy, they may seriously disrupt economic organization,
they may place unbearable burdens on groups of people who
have no voice in their waging. Yet even in a country like ours,
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which is firmly dedicated to the support of judicial institutions,
which has even subjected disputes between the states of our
Union to the jurisdiction of our Supreme Court, few of us
would be so bold as to favor conferring on our courts a gen-
eral jurisdiction over disputes between employers and labor
unions. We proceed on the idea that in this field other bodies
which are not confined to classical judicial procedure may be
more efficacious and hence more useful. Such bodies may not
arrive more nearly to justice, their decisions may not have
complete finality, yet they may succeed in maintaining indus-
trial peace until the situation involved in the dispute moves on
to new ground.
I suggest that the same thinking applies to some of the
disputes between independent States. In some cases, the essen-
tial thing may be, not so much the settlement of the dispute,
but rather the preservation of peace. And to this end, it may be
better that they be handled by politicians and not by judges.
This was recognized in the Covenant of the League of
Nations, which went beyond any previous instrument in re-
quiring the submission to the Council of any "dispute likely
to lead to a rupture." In the same order of ideas, the Charter
has now conferred on the Security Council, as the body having
"primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security," a competence with respect to disputes "the
continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security." Already in the first months
of the life of the new Organization, the extent of this compe-
tence and the manner in which it is to be exercised have be-
come matters for public disputation, and I hope you will have
the patience to permit me to enter upon a somewhat detailed
analysis of the setting of the Security Council in our latest
approach to the broad field of pacific settlement.
The Security Council
The competence of the Security Council to deal with disputes
of the character I have mentioned is closely connected with
its competence to deal with situations "which might lead to
international friction or give rise to a dispute." The distinction
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between disputes and situations is important because of the
provision in Article 27 of the Charter that for certain of
the decisions which may be taken by the Security Council, "the
party to a dispute shall abstain from voting." No such ab-
stention is required for a comparable decision as to a situation.
Moreover, under Article 32 each State which is not a member
of the Security Council must be invited to participate, without
vote, in the discussion relating to a dispute to which it is a
party. The initial experience of the Security Council has
tended to accentuate the distinction, and has revealed that it
may have to be considered before there is a basis for pro-
ceeding with the application of Chapter VI of the Charter,
which embodies most of the provisions dealing with pacific
settlement.
Logically, to have a dispute, there must be parties to it, and
the parties must have engaged in a mutual confrontation of
opposing views. It is not enough that one party holds views
which the other does not share or is prepared to oppose. A
claim must have been made, and either resisted or ignored or
otherwise not complied with. The subject of the dispute must
have been given some delineation. It is essential that one party
shall have stated its views to the other, in order that the other
party shall have had at least the opportunity to express its ob-
servations and its opposition. This was forcibly put by Judge
Moore in the Mavrommatis Case: for a dispute to exist, he
said, "there must be a pre-existent difference, certainly in the
sense and to the extent that the government which professes to
have been aggrieved should have stated its claims and the
grounds on which they rest, and that the other government
should have had an opportunity to reply, and if it rejects the
demands, to give its reasons for so doing." 2 This would seem
to involve at least some feint at negotiations, though perhaps
no general rule can be laid down as to the extent of the pre-
vious negotiations required. A situation, on the other hand,
may exist in the absence of any confrontation of views and
without any semblance of negotiations.
1 am far from thinking, however, that when a matter is
before the Security Council, that body will be impelled by
2 Permanent Court of International Justice, Series A, No. 2, p. 61.
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logic in reaching a decision on the question whether it is seised
of a dispute or of a situation. This might be viewed as a pro-
cedural question, though the concurring votes of all permanent
members of the Security Council would be required for such a
conclusion. If a precedent could be set when the pending
matter involves no member of the Security Council, or at least
none of the permanent members, less difficulty might arise;
but where a permanent member is involved, it seems more
probable that the question may be viewed as not procedural,
and hence a decision that the pending matter is a dispute and
not a situation would require the concurrence of the five
permanent members. 3 At this very preliminary stage, the pos-
sibility of useful action by the Security Council might be
foreclosed.
Once the Security Council has decided that a matter before
it is to be dealt with as a dispute, it may also have to take a
preliminary decision, for purposes of later disposition, as to
who are the parties to the dispute. It is possible that this also
will be viewed as a substantive rather than a procedural
question; if so, the seven votes required will have to include
those of all the permanent members. Apart from any difficulty
otherwise existing— and it may not always be a simple matter
to say who the parties are— this preliminary question may be
a stumbling block in the application of Chapter VI of the
Charter. Until it is decided, no basis may exist for requiring
an abstention in the voting.
The Security Council may take cognizance of a dispute on
the suggestion of any Member of the United Nations, whether
or not it is a party to the dispute. A State not a Member may
bring to the attention of the Security Council a dispute to
which it is a party only if it accepts for the purpose "the obli-
gations of pacific settlement provided in" the Charter; I have
already indicated the tenuous character of those obligations.
Under Article 99, even the Secretary General may bring to the
attention of the Security Council a dispute if he deems that it
is a matter which "may threaten the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security." So far as Members of the United
3 Consideration and discussion of a dispute or situation would not
require such a vote, however.
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Nations are concerned, they are obligated to "refer" a dispute
which they fail to settle by peaceful means ; but this obligation
is limited to those disputes which are of such a character that
their continuance "is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security." Article 34 of the Charter
confers on the Security Council the power to initiate ex
proprio mohi an investigation of any dispute whatsoever, for
the purpose of determining whether it has that character ; this
provision may be considered somewhat illusory, however, for
the Security Council can move only on the initiative of one
of its members. In view of its broad power under Article 39 to
"determine the existence of any threat to the peace," the Se-
curity Council has an ample competence to deal with any acute
dispute which has progressed to the dangerous stage.
Once it finds itself seised of a dispute between definite
parties, what are the powers of the Security Council? Here,
Chapter VI contains overlapping provisions which are so lack-
ing in integration as to conjure up unnecessary difficulties.
Article 38 of the Charter seems to be the most general
part of Chapter VI, in that it applies to "any dispute," what-
ever its nature may be. This Article is set apart by its preamble
from others in the Chapter, and it falls outside the schematic
framework of the latter. By agreement of all the parties, any
dispute may be brought to the Security Council, and if all the
parties so request, the Security Council may make recommen-
dations with a view to its pacific settlement. Doubtless the re-
quest may have been made in advance of the origin of the dis-
pute ; the parties may have agreed in advance that the Security
Council may act under Article 38. Hence the provision may
serve an important role in the drafting of international instru-
ments when it is desired to foresee the handling of disputes
concerning interpretation and application by a procedure more
flexible than resort to judicial determination. In time, there-
fore, the Security Council may come to be vested with useful
functions such as those with which the Council of the League
was vested, and which it sometimes performed.
Apart from Article 38, the schematic Articles of Chapter
VI seem to limit the Security Council to determining whether
a dispute is of such a character that its continuance "is likely
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to endanger the maintenance of international peace and se-
curity," and to exercising the powers conferred only with ref-
erence to such disputes. A similar limitation was imposed on
the Council of the League of Nations by Article 15 of the
Covenant, and two interesting cases revealed its consequences.
Both in the Finnish Ships Case in 1932- 1935, and in the Swiss
War Damages Case in 1935, the League Council was faced
with disputes which were not "likely to lead to a rupture"
(under Article 15), and which did not threaten to disturb in-
ternational peace (under Article 11). In both cases, the Council
found itself lacking in competence to follow out any useful
procedure. The conclusion put a premium on the rattling of
a sabre by one of the disputants, to the deprecation of assur-
ances of peaceful intentions.
I must now consider the course which may be taken by the
Security Council, after it has determined that the dispute
before it is of such a character that its continuance "is likely
to endanger the maintenance of international peace and se-
curity." This course must fall under the five articles of Chap-
ter VI, excluding Article 38, and the ascertained parties to the
dispute must abstain from voting if they are members of the
Security Council. The procedure is to be sharply distinguished
from the "action" envisaged in Chapter VII with respect to
"any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression" which may be determined to exist.
Article 33 provides that the Security Council may "when it
deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute"
by peaceful means. If it may sometimes be useful to remind
disputants of the means which are at their disposal, the pro-
vision serves no other end, and on occasion it may have little
significance. It is reminiscent of the proverb about leading a
horse to water. To speak of the Security Council's having an
"absolute duty" in this connection, 4 is to distort the reality.
Powers may be conferred on international bodies, but it is
specious to conceive of them as having duties.
Much more important is the power of the Security Council
under Article 36 to "recommend appropriate procedures or
methods of adjustment," at "any stage" of such a dispute be-
4 Goodrich & Hambro, Charter of the United Nations (1946), p. 145.
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fore it. Here it is not limited to a reminder to the parties that
certain means are available to them. It may select that proce-
dure which in the circumstances it considers to be most ap-
propriate. Of course it will take into consideration, as para-
graph 2 of Article 36 enjoins, the procedures which the parties
may have employed or may have agreed to employ. Significant
also is the provision in paragraph 3 that it should take into
consideration "that legal disputes should as a general rule be
referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice."
The phrase "by the parties" was inserted to escape an infer-
ence in the suggestion emanating from Dumbarton Oaks5 that
"justiciable disputes should normally be referred to the inter-
national court of justice"; that suggestion had been inter-
preted to mean that the reference might be made by the Se-
curity Council, with the result that the Court could be called
upon to deal with a dispute though none of the parties should
appear before it. The force of paragraph 3 is attenuated by its
concluding clause, "in accordance with the provisions of the
Statute of the Court." Unless a State has in some way accepted
the Court's jurisdiction, the Statute provides for reference to
the Court only by special agreement of the parties.
The Security Council's recommendations under Article 36
of the Charter apply only to procedures or methods of adjust-
ment. Article 37 goes further with respect to disputes "re-
ferred" to the Security Council by the parties, apparently by
any one of them, 6 after their failure to reach a settlement by
peaceful means. Here the recommendation of the Security
Council may go beyond procedures and methods; it may set
forth "terms of settlement" of the dispute. In other words,
the Council may go into the substance of the matter, may con-
sider it an fond, and may propose the disposition which it con-
siders desirable. The parties will not be bound to adopt the
disposition proposed, but the refusal of a party to accept a
recommendation might weigh in a later determination as to the
existence of a threat to the peace.
5 Chapter VIII, A, 6.
6
1 say "apparently," for this interpretation would seem to have been
given by Committee III/2 at San Francisco. Document 433, III/2/15; 12
Documents of the United Nations Conference, p. 47. Yet the text is far
less clear on this point than was paragraph 1 of Article 15 of the Covenant.
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Let me summarize the role of the Security Council briefly.
Two questions are preliminary to the application of Chapter
VI of the Charter: ( i) whether a dispute exists, and (2) if so,
who are the parties. These questions have to be resolved as a
basis for applying the proviso in paragraph 3 of Article 27
which requires abstention from voting by a party to a dispute,
and the second question may have to be resolved as a basis for
applying the provision in Article 32 that a party to a dispute
must be invited to participate in the discussion. Any Member
may bring any dispute to the attention of the Security Council;
under certain conditions a non-Member may bring to its at-
tention a dispute to which it is a party, and the Secretary
General may do so. Or the Security Council may investigate
any dispute on its own initiative to ascertain its character. If
all the parties to a dispute so request, the Security Council
may make recommendations as to its settlement. Otherwise,
the Security Council is limited to dealing with disputes "the
continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security." When a dispute is found to
be of such a nature, appropriate procedures or methods of ad-
justment may be recommended by the Security Council. After
a failure by the parties to settle a dispute by peaceful means,
one of them may "refer" it to the Security Council, and in
this case the latter may go so far as to recommend terms of
settlement.
Chapter VI is so belabored in its construction that it offers
a fertile field for disputation. 7 The draftsmen at Dumbarton
Oaks are chiefly responsible for its confusion. Not uncom-
monly where agreement can not be achieved, a draftsman must
seek a studied lack of clarity, and it is too much to ask that
great instruments, international or otherwise, should always
be crystal clear. It is possible, therefore, that Chapter VI was
well drafted under the circumstances. Yet I think one principle
must be kept in mind in applying it. The Security Council is
not a tribunal, it is not circumscribed by the classical limita-
tions of the judicial process, and it may therefore exercise
some freedom in developing the practice which will shape its
7 See L. M. Goodrich, in 39 American Political Science Reviezv (1945),
p. 956.
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precedents. The services which it will render as an agency
for dealing with international disputes will depend upon the
spirit in which its task is approached, and an arid legalism
should not be permitted to dominate that spirit.
The General Assembly
I now turn to the role of the General Assembly in connection
with the pacific settlement of international disputes. This role
is so attenuated, it depends on such slight constitutional foun-
dations, that no elaborate analysis is required, and I can be
very brief.
First of all, the General Assembly has a broad competence
to discuss any question relating to the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security. This competence clearly extends
to disputes, and hence it is possible for any Member of the
United Nations, or the Security Council, to bring a dispute
before the General Assembly. Such action may also be taken
by a non-Member State as a party to the dispute, if it accepts
the Charter's obligations of pacific settlement.
Once it is seised of a dispute, the General Assembly has
a greater freedom than the Security Council. It may pro-
ceed to discuss it as a "question relating to the maintenance
of international peace and security," without a formal determi-
nation that its continuance would be "likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security." The dis-
cussion may lead the General Assembly to making recommen-
dations to the States concerned or to the Security Council or
to both, with the qualification that while the Security Council
is exercising its functions with respect to the dispute, no
recommendations may be made unless the Security Council so
requests. Under this qualification, it would seem that the Se-
curity Council could disable the General Assembly at any time
by beginning to investigate the dispute of which the latter has
taken cognizance. The broad competence of the General As-
sembly to "recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment
of any situation" which it finds to be of such a character that
it is "likely to impair . . . friendly relations among nations,"
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would also seem to cover disputes; but this too is subject to
the qualification which I have just mentioned.
On this analysis, it would seem that the powers of the
General Assembly with reference to disputes are quite general.
If they are not extensive, and if the field can at any time be
pre-empted by the Security Council, there is still a possibility
that when success is not attained in the Security Council, that
body can disengage itself and request the General Assembly
to exercise its powers. It is therefore possible that in some
cases the General Assembly will fill a role not unlike that
which sometimes devolved upon the Assembly of the League
of Nations.
Conclusion
If I have presumed upon your interest in this somewhat tedi-
ous analysis, it is because I feel that it is important for us to
appreciate the details of the constitutional basis upon which
the organs of the United Nations have been placed in dealing
with disputes. The Security Council particularly must operate
within very definite circumscriptions, and a failure to realize
their bounds may lead to an exaggeration of its role in the
public mind, with a consequent disappointment of expecta-
tions. The Charter does not supply us with a complete and
global system of pacific procedures. Its dominant note is not
the settlement of disputes, but the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security. Yet within its framework there is
room for the establishment of practices and precedents which
may usefully serve to implement the general principle that
States should seek to settle their disputes "by peaceful means
in such a manner that international peace and security" will
not be endangered.
We do not need to exaggerate the significant achievement
of the Charter. It has not by itself effected the dawning of a
new day in the world's outlook. It may lack some of the
features which you and I would have wished it to embody.
It is far from guaranteeing a satisfactory handling and dis-
position of all the disputes which are bound to arise. Yet I am
sure that you share my gratification in having this great in-
strument as the basis for cooperation among the States of
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the world. It gives us opportunity for the exercise of all the
intelligence, all the ingenuity, and all the imagination which
we can muster to that end. These alone will not be enough,
however. Behind them must be a will to make the Charter
work, to create the common understanding which will not let
it fail. Given that will and that understanding, we can hope
that we have passed into a new era of the pacific settlement
of international disputes.
The provisions of the Charter are not enough in them-
selves. Fortunately, however, they can be supplemented, and
to this end we may look forward to a resumption of the move-
ment which gave such promise in the decade from 1925 to
1935. Procedures are needed for dealing with all kinds of
disputes and for assuring their settlement to the largest extent
possible. An effort to devise such procedures may result in a
valuable supplement to the Charter.
{7i}
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At this point of time after World War II, it is impossible
to declare that the pacification of mind and conditions the
world expected is anywhere near realization. The world is
more troubled than it was in the year 1939, bedeviled with
anxieties and fearing war, wondering, indeed, whether war
is avoidable. Never were great aggressor powers defeated as
crushingly as Germany and Japan were defeated. They have
fallen, yet terror has risen. The United Nations, the inter-
national organization established to replace the League of
Nations and designed to avoid the mistakes made by the
League in the twenty years of its existence, has for nearly
two years been the scene of brawls among the great powers,
and purposeful obstruction of united action.
What lies before us ? Is it peace or war? Is it justice among
the nations, as sketched in the Preamble of the United Nations
Charter, or the enthronement of power regardless of justice?
Shall the course of conflict and tension be resolved by Per-
suasion or by Force? To understand our circumstances, and
so learn to appreciate our duty, it is necessary to pass beyond
the immediate quarrels between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.
and to look deeply into the tensions that have been perennial,
and invoke the great historic background of the relationship
between nations. 2
"Let the great world spin forever down the ringing grooves
of change" before us, and let us take the telescope's view of
this globe and the power that bursts explosively from every
living person. For the problem of Persuasion or Force is not
one that can be answered either theoretically or practically
without metaphysics or a search for man as he is supposed to
have been when in a state of nature.
delivered May 6, 1947.
2 For a comprehensive analysis, see Finer, America's Destiny (New
York, 1947).
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Present Anxieties and Fears
The international world does not consist of individual human
beings, but of nations. People can not speak to people except
as corporate bodies. The integers of international life are these
peculiar corporate personalities called nations. All our troubles
arise from this stubborn fact. I will return to its significance
presently, but simply say at this point that each nation repre-
sents a different way of life so dear, for various reasons, to
its members, that it is perennially afflicted with an intense fear
of annihilation.
If these nations were completely severable from each other,
all might enjoy tranquillity and composure in the practice of
their own ways of life. But they are not severable for certain
persistent and exigent reasons. Almost all nations have come
to set a high value on economic well-being. The teaching of the
economists, the stories of wealth elsewhere, the example of the
upper classes with their glamorous, leisured, secure lives,
the films of Hollywood, the promises of technologists— all
these have conspired to make a high material standard of liv-
ing almost the supreme object of human endeavor and aspira-
tion. The Gandhis of the world are very few: the followers
who are prepared to go back to spinning and loincloths do not
even make a crowd. The most revolutionary state of our time,
Soviet Russia, preaches the virtue of industrialization, and
has anathematized as a heresy both poverty and equality of
compensation. There is no sign at all that Stalin is anxious to
clothe himself as Gandhi does, and get himself a spinning
wheel as an example to all Russians, or even to the Russian
Communist Party.
For most countries this addiction to material wealth in-
volves dependence on other nations, economically. The world
is one network of trade, which implies a specialization and di-
vision of labor. There is a certain rancor connected with this
interdependence, because it is at once craved and yet resented.
For it does take nations outside themselves as units, and all
sorts of international conflicts are set up by the different out-
looks of the diverse interests within each country. Economic
interdependence is something the nations must cultivate. If
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it is disrupted there are recriminations ; if it is fostered, there
are contacts between nations, and the nations have different
ways of life. If people could be persuaded, if it were proper
to persuade them to have nothing at all to do with other
nations, however great the cost in their economic well-being, a
diminution of tensions would occur, and war would be so
much further off. This is most unlikely. The cure of the
troubles lying in some trade may be the logical expansion of
even more trade. This thread will be picked up again presently.
Yet economic nonintercourse would still leave the nations
inseverable. They would still be united territorially. We have
become accustomed to think in this country of a world-wide
dispute between two discrete Himalayan peaks or poles— the
U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., and it is often written that the two
can not get at each other, and so war is inconceivable. There
is one book whose whole thesis revolves about this point.
Henry Wallace has spoken again and again in this sense. But
this view ignores the elementary truth that between these
nations and around them stretch the connecting seas, and lands.
The coasts are inhabited; the seas are approaches; the lands
hold peoples. There is no point where one nation really ends.
No regionalization of the world, no deep-dug trenches, no
Maginot walls, no screens held around the frontiers by sky-
flying blimps, can sever the physical contact of each nation
with the other, or stop them from actually treading on each
other's nerve centers— their capitals— or from infiltration.
Bases, beach-heads— these are constituted by one's own ter-
ritory, and the territory of allies in the proximity of other
nations. Thus, Greece, Turkey, Iceland, Greenland, Spitz-
bergen, Norway, the Mediterranean— the examples are clear
and cogent in the troubles of our time. The speed of weapon
carriers, and their lifting power, has shrunk the world to the
governmental dimensions of a single nation of the nineteenth
century.
Even if the nations could be severed, they would not be
proof against the human interest in the rights and duties of
human beings wherever they are— that is, proof against the
moral penetration of ideas, and the passions that they can
arouse. The Soviet Union manifests this in especial degree,
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and her rulers have again and again expressed their view that
they are the vanguard of proletarian morality all over the
world. No single day witnesses a surcease of moralizing about
events in other nations, and encouragement to the dissatisfied
to change conditions, even by violence, and without majority
persuasion. In democracies, into which news can easily pene-
trate, and where expression is free, morality does not end with
the frontier. It is impossible to prohibit conscience from being
outraged or inspired by what happens abroad, and to wish to
run to help or to stop what is happening. More, it is unde-
sirable, for democracies, that this spontaneous moral feeling
should be repressed or ignored— for such a course would
render democracy cynical, and it would be doomed to ugliness,
and perhaps extinction through lack of self-defense, or un-
bridled internal troubles.
Hence, though the world is divided into seventy sovereign
nations, the fate of each touches the fate of all, and vitally.
This truth has the important implication that the constitu-
tion of each country is a part of the constitution of all other
countries. If it is in any way corrupt, the constitutions of other
countries are infected. Consider the shape of the constitutions,
and the spirit in which they are worked, of some of the Euro-
pean nations under duress from their mightier neighbors
!
I have introduced this point merely to arrive at the special
stage in the argument we must now consider, namely, the
nature of "total" war. I do not refer to the globe-wide ex-
tension of modern war, or to the fact that all the population
of the belligerents and all industry and agriculture are involved
in war. I have in mind the fact that the cause of war has come
to be considered the way of life of the enemy, and that it is to
be expected that he will endeavor to wipe out that way of life
altogether and substitute another, in order never again to be
subject to attack. In other words, the cause of war is con-
sidered to be in the minds of the makers of war, and it is
thought that the only way to safeguard peace is to deal drasti-
cally with that way of life. I need not go into the historical
and philosophical causes of this phenomenon. But its existence
is obvious. It is a product of the ideological disputes of our
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time, and especially those that began with the Communist
seizure of power by Lenin. World War II was in part caused
by this ; was fought as ferociously as it was under this impulse.
The "total" struggle gave rise to "genocide"— that is, the
deliberate extermination for political reasons of whole national
groups, or groups holding certain political ideas. It is being
continued in the disputes over assistance to displaced persons,
and the problem of handing over to certain governments al-
leged "war criminals." It is being pursued, without cessation,
in a world-wide debate, and in the maneuvers of the great
powers in the Balkans and in Poland, Hungary, Austria, and
Germany.
The advent of total war in this sense can not but keep the
world in fear and turmoil and a state of war between wars,
for the whole national existence is at stake, or felt to be.
I suggested that at some point in world history this was
bound to happen. The only question was whether education
in universal humanity would advance faster than the moral
interpenetration and clash of different national ways of life.
The national ways of life have won. Each realizes— I mean
the extremes realize— that the unity of the world (as already
analyzed) imposes a minimum moral unity, if there is to be
peace, and the question therefore is, whose minimum morality
shall it be? The world's tension and ordeal arises out of this
global question.
Another factor must be added: the advent of weapons of
mass destruction, as the atom bomb and bacteriological war-
fare— the first horrible for its devastating, defense-crushing
power, the latter awful for its deadliness and the impossibility
of observing the attack until the victims are down with the dis-
ease. The chief effect of these weapons, and more especially
the knowledge that they can be manufactured and used, is to
increase the nervousness of national leaders and secretaries of
state. For "the cushion of time," the margin of assumable risk,
has slimmed down. The foreign secretary can not take risks,
and, therefore, is bound to pursue a diplomacy which fore-
stalls his potential enemy ; can not make concessions lest a con-
cession is the loss of a strategic asset ; can not trust the word
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of the negotiator lest the word is a worm (as has already
proved clear in the entanglements over the Yalta and Potsdam
agreements) ; can not make a treaty lest it is an exercise in
treachery.
The l^ation
The unit of international relations, the sovereign nation, is a
corporate personality. It is a personality in the sense that it is
a complete whole, with character, outlook, energy, a history, a
feeling of unity and insistence on a future, and with spiritual
objectives backed up by energies. It is no use attempting to be-
little it, as Acton did, and as some more recent commentators
do, as an error, a malady of infancy, an artificial state of mind.
This is a condition of man that has taken centuries to grow
;
it is growth, not caprice. This personality is corporate; it
absorbs individual personalities. Though a corporation, being
a collective person, allows of differences of will within the
collective personality, there is surprisingly little internal dif-
ference when the question of self-preservation of the society
is touched.
Now, the determining circumstance of the national corpo-
ration is Locality. Most of men's elementary and ardent crav-
ings have come to be satisfied, up to this point of time in
history, by the corporation that has formed on a distinct
locality. Men yearn for value, not merely commodity. They
want more than a stone, they need bread; they need more
than bread, they need spiritual purpose and justification. They
need praise, that is, they need a hierarchy of values, and an
authority that raises them up in their rightful place. They need
a sense of attachment and home. The nation gives them that.
They yearn for an intimation of their immortality; this collec-
tive person embraces them in its immortality. The combined
researches and thinking of constitutional historians, anthro-
pologists,- and psychoanalysts, have demonstrated the coinci-
dence of the Locality, the Home, and the Divine— that is, the
nation. It is this local society that has in our own day, then,
amalgamated the services of religious minister, ethical leader,
and spiritual healer, and combined therewith the gifts of public
order and increasingly of economic provision.
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Yet all these nations have a different ethos. For each has
emerged in its own local tethering, and the centuries of history
have differentiated cumulatively the differences of location,
geography, climate, economic pursuits, natural resources, the
vicissitudes of battle, plague, victory, defeat, triumph, and
subjugation, with different languages, spiritual worship, and
different scripts. All this has become bound up with each in-
dividual, as his own possession and object of adoration and
loyalty. Nothing exists that can compete on anything like equal
terms with the hold that Locality gets over the religious,
spiritual, emotional, and social satisfactions of the child from
the moment he is born, and for every moment thereafter, until
by the age of reflection he is nationally conditioned, and
beyond reflection.
It is useless to pretend that this is a silly, trivial, aberration
of the mind. Man is born national, he is not born free. This is
the factor that must be kept in mind in the problem of Force
or Persuasion. For the fear of the loss of home and affection
is the essential cause of the piling up of defenses and of arms.
In our own time, it is vastly aggravated by the elements of in-
ternational anxiety already described.
I think I may pause to say that the best-known mitigation
of nationalism, that is, group pride, is probably the dispersal
of leadership and the freedom of dissent, represented by
democracy.
As Locality will continue, since men can not in sufficient
numbers become nomads over the face of the earth, national
loyalty will continue. This must continue to require sover-
eignty of will for the national group, whether the nation be
small or large. You can only transfer sovereignty if you are
prepared to transform your national way of life. The national
way of life consists of economic means, as well as social
manners, government, and civil liberties. It does not consist
only in economic desires. Some economic well-being, of spe-
cific kinds, however, is necessary to support the way of life;
for example, the Russian collective mechanized farm, or the
power to leave the city and drive furiously through the
countryside bent on innocent picnics, as in the United States.
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If these things are surrendered, it is not merely the surrender
of these things, but of an integral part of the whole of the
way of life. You may pursue these speculations beyond the
point for which I have time here.
The Individual and the Veto Power in the
United 7s[ations
It is idle, therefore, for the individual in those nations where
he can make his voice heard, to criticize the veto power of the
Big Five. It is the individual's wishes that have indirectly
but firmly produced the veto power. Would he surrender his
standard of living, his form of government, his job, or his
civil liberties to a vote by majority of a world congress ? The
answer has been given for him by his Secretary of State or
the Commissar for Foreign Affairs. If it is an American who
is confronted with this question, then he can not but reject the
potential power of the millions of impoverished peoples of the
world to outvote him in the matter of his standard of living,
through the casting down of immigration barriers, or of
tariffs. The U.S.A. delegates to San Francisco took particular
care that their economy be considered a matter of "essentially
domestic concern." But, is it? The Soviet delegates were
adamant on the veto, on their own equality, not only with
any one other great power, but with all of them put together
— determined that they should not be put in a minority, and
their way of life thereby endangered. They have used their
power, as was expected, and as was arranged, to exclude from
membership of the United Nations the states they do not like;
to support those that are their friends and potentially their
satellites; to quash an almost unanimous vote of censure on
the Albanian government for cognizance, at least, of the
placing of mines which killed British sailors in the waters of
Corfu Channel; to keep Greece in an uproar; to obstruct the
advent of a European Economic Commission; to obstruct the
establishment of an International Refugee Organization; and
to obstruct the establishment of an international bill of human
rights, among many other things. And above all, they have
used their power to prevent the establishment of an interna-
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tional authority for the control of atomic energy, with major-
ity powers of preventive and punitive action, on the grounds
which are most apposite in relation to the discussion of na-
tionalism; that is, that the Soviet government must always
be in a minority, and that she could not expect, therefore, to be
treated with justice, or expect her economic system not to be
interfered with by the international authority.
The veto power is a creature of nationalism, and national-
ism is a creature of the individuals who dwell in the several
nations. The Secretary of State casts not his but their vote,
and he casts it for the things they want.
The United Nations is the maximum answer, extorted
from the grinding necessities of severely reluctant nations, to
the world's need of unity-in-justice if the scourge of war is to
be lifted. It is a deficient answer, for all its activities are trivial,
important as they are, compared with the responsibility of the
Security Council for conciliation, and ultimately the prohi-
bition of war, and the restoration of peace if war should break
out. That responsibility is frustrated by the veto power, so far
as any large nation is concerned.
It is, therefore, juvenile folly of the weakest kind to urge
world government, or world republic, or world federation.
There, before the eyes of the world, at Lake Success, in Paris,
in Moscow, in London— it is blatantly, rigorously, shoutingly
rejected.
The United Nations Charter is a treaty like other treaties.
- There is even the easiest provision for withdrawal imaginable.
The Charter depends on the readiness of the nations to keep
their promises. But promises are set down in words, and words
are likely, especially when languages are very different, to be
twisted, sometimes in good faith, often not. And this is all
that remains of a common morality in the world: the idea,
embodied in international law, created by a world of independ-
ent states, in the dictum, pacta sunt servanda; that is to say,
treaties, or promises, must be fulfilled. But this is only a
reliable foundation of peace if, in the absence of a common
superior, there is a concourse of minds, a minimum common
morality universally held.
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We have, however, suggested that the world is morally
riven, and badly riven. It could not be expected, therefore, that
a world community with world government should arise out
of voluntary agreement. If it were possible, it would not be
necessary. If world government is thrust forward as the only
solution, ruthlessly, it can only come about in one of two ways:
in a very distant future when the work of mass education, uni-
versally, is of such effect that governments or constitutional
conventions come into existence in the several nations that
will establish such ; or by the force of an armed superior. The
world government advocates have not supplied us with the
doctrine that will give us a clue to the acceptability of a com-
mon morality; and they have not faithfully confronted the
alternative of force. In short, they have not confronted
themselves.
Of Persuasion
A minimum of world organization is essential to the world's
peace and its pursuit of justice. The reasons have been amply
given. It needs to be a minimum, for the power of nationalism
is strong, and the Locality must still continue to provide man
with the everyday assurances that he needs in this strange
world and wide. A minimum is already present in the United
Nations, but it is satisfactory only for the peoples of north-
western Europe, Britain, the Mediterranean, the U.S.A.,
Canada, the other British Dominions, perhaps India (largely
by reason of the education of her political leaders in England),
and some Latin American countries. There may be others to
which this pax extends. But it does not extend to Germany,
and it does not extend to the Soviet rulers— it is idle to say
Russia, for we know nothing about the sentiments of the Rus-
sian people today. Russia under the Soviet rulers is deliber-
ately, of set purpose, and with hatred and venom, kept out of
the pax. Germany, it is said, must be re-educated, and then,
in the next breath it is said that she can not be re-educated.
If this is so, how can she be handled not to be a menace? It
can not be by Persuasion. And the same answer would seem to
apply to the Soviet rulers, for they know better than all their
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adulators, and they have said that they are intransigent, and
consider this intransigence to be their duty and their glory.
Now persuasion could appeal to Humanity, to Common
Sense, to Economic Advantage. If Humanity is proposed, that
is, to act towards all men everywhere with equal justice and
compassion, then this is rejected by the Soviet. It is not re-
jected of principle by the Western powers; or at least, they
are ready for continual concessions, and have made many. The
Soviet rulers reject the West precisely in the name of Hu-
manity. But if it were a Humanity of principle, there would be
some hope. It is instead a hybrid of principle and personal
power. When the mere deviationist within one's own nation is
mercilessly put to the sword, or rather the revolver, what
better fate can be offered the complete heretic beyond the
frontiers? Man is only the Kremlin Man: the rest, as the
literature of the Kremlin expresses it, are "beasts," or "Fas-
cists," or "social democratic fascists" — all, in short, who
differ from the will of the Kremlin's leaders.
The Soviet rulers have rejected a vital part of their in-
heritance from Marx. He was carrying forward the French
Revolution in its sublimest essence: Liberty, Equality, and
Fraternity. Perhaps the Soviet rulers have fostered Fraternity
;
it is doubtful whether they have promoted Equality ; it is cer-
tain that they have destroyed Liberty, and of set purpose,
because they despised and still despise the capacity of the ordi-
nary man to steer his own course in the long voyages of
political life. Instead, they have grafted on him their own revo-
lutionary consciousness, and it happens to be a graft that is not
skin-deep, but soul-deep. They have this same contempt for all
men who will not follow their path, and submit to their unified
direction. And so it is, that of all things they hate, it is de-
mocracy, Western democracy, the only true democracy, the
only legitimate definition and practical elaboration of the
principle, that they hate most. They hate it when it associates
with free enterprise. They hate it, if it is the accompaniment
and the creator of socialism in the Western countries of
Europe. For they have rejected freedom, and its political con-
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sequences, and the nonmaterialistic conception of human
nature which has always inspired it.
If there is no hope for an appeal to Humanity, then neither
Economic Advantage, nor a Common Sense rejection of war
and its material and human ravages can be expected to have
any better result. With peoples of pacific intention, not ob-
sessed by venomous hatred, these appeals can mean much.
And economic assistance has its place as an act of charity, as
well as an inducement to allies to be faithful in a common
front against an intransigent neighbor.
It is only common sense to admit that a state of mind can
exist which is not susceptible of persuasion. We all have had
many occasions to witness this in our academic life; and the
law courts every day have thousands of cases to exemplify
this trite observation. That the Soviet rulers have cause for
suspicion is perfectly true, for many acts of ill-will and hos-
tility have been perpetrated against them. But would it not be
fair, looking back over events between the Leninist coup of
November, 191 7, and the Hitler-Stalin Pact of August, 1939,
to say that they themselves asked for it? The Soviet rulers
have a shocking record, and they have gloried in it. If it is
urged that what the Soviet has perpetrated in Europe since
19 1 7 through the Comintern, through the usual diplomatic
channels, and during the war, and since, in this hideous cam-
paign to rule Europe or ruin its peoples, if it is urged that the
purpose was defense, the answer is that, in a community,
some kinds of defense are so dangerous to other people, that
it is not surprising if they cease their efforts at loving-kindness
and persuasion. ,
Force and Fear in the Service of Humanity
The pressure of world forces, ideological and material, noticed
at the beginning of this lecture, is such that persuasion will
not be accepted, while the territorial contiguity continues to be
so great that a settlement must be made— that is, if a state
of peace is to be established.
No doubt exists that those who have followed out the logic
of securing a common superior who will assert and support
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a universal common morality are right in the general sug-
gestions they have made. That logic leads to the Wilsonian
principle that all governments in a world organization be
democratic. And there follows, secondly, the newer principle,
that the nations guarantee their peoples a bill of human liber-
ties, or rights.
I will consider the bearing, importance, and the prospects
of these, on the problem of peace by force or persuasion.
If all governments were popularly elected and popularly
controlled, that is, if they were democratic in form, it could be
expected that the impetus to war would be restrained. For the
main danger of nationality is that it is a unified society, and
its oneness is, by hypothesis, exclusive and uncompromising.
There are states that boast of being one and indivisible, and
some that boast that they are "monolithic." It is solidity of
loyalty, or at least, of obedience, that needs loosening. For it is
necessary, in order to admit an influence on the unified will
of the objections of foreign negotiating countries, to reduce
the power represented by the singleness of control of the re-
sources of the whole nation (and this will tend to reassure
watchful and fearful foreign powers that the power confront-
ing them need not be so seriously feared as otherwise), to
admit dissent, and the delay of constitutional procedures, and
to enforce explanations in public of what the government in-
tends. Wilson saw clearly the mollifying international influence
of divided counsels in each nation, the reassurance to be ob-
tained by "open covenants openly arrived at." Hence, his
proposal that the League admit into membership only "self-
governing" states. He was in the twentieth century traversing
the path of Kant in the eighteenth, and both were right. It is
not certain that democracies will always be pacifist, but it
is more likely that they will ; and sometimes, indeed, they may
be too pacifist for the tasks of their day.
The Wilsonian principle carries the implication of an as-
similation of the form of government of all countries. The
Soviet principle does this also. The first offers freedom
within each country, and considerable self-determination of a
federal nature in the international order that would thus
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emerge. The Soviet, as its German policy demonstrates, is not
friendly to federalism, whatever it may say in its constitution
about its own republic. There is no doubt that it reduces to the
bare bone the notion of "cultural" autonomy that it would
leave to the separate "nations" in a world order unified by its
own principles. I leave out the fullest logic of the Soviet
regime, unification by a single despotic party.
The Wilsonian principle is, today, most forcibly repudiated
by the Soviet rulers, as it was in 1914-1918 by the Imperial
system of Germany. Even the suggestion, made in the British
House of Commons in November, 1945, that the idea of a
world parliament was worth pondering, was repudiated by
Praz'da as reactionary.
If this democratic assimilation of governments is not now
achieved, and it seems impossible of achievement in any im-
mediate future by peaceful means, unlikely too is the other
proposal for the establishment of an international bill of
rights. I do not intend to list and describe all the array of
rights which have been proposed by various individuals and
organizations. The principal are the right of freedom of speech
and writing, the right of movement and migration, freedom
from detention or imprisonment except by due course of law,
freedom of worship, freedom of association, and the right to
secure release from detention by writ which is obligatory on
the police and the executive. It can be seen at once where these
rights tend, especially when they are bound up with the opera-
tion of the democratic form of government, of which they are
the supports and at the same time the guaranteed fruits. They
loosen the uniform, crushing, solidity of the corporate person-
ality, the nation. They make it possible for mind to meet mind
across the frontiers, and for an international, or rather, a
super-national, fellowship of men, to be nurtured. If they do
not altogether cast down the barriers of corporate personality
and the frontier-guards, and all the separation of men from
men they stand for, at least they mitigate all the ferocity and
intransigence of nationalism. In commenting on the San
Francisco Conference and the Charter that emerged there-
from, Mr. Stettinius, in his report to the President, emphasized
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the opinion of the United States that though the freedoms
spoken of in the Charter were not clearly defined, and certainly
not all listed, " 'the fundamental freedoms' include freedom of
speech and that freedom of speech involves, in international
relationships, freedom of exchange of information." Of
course! And the reference is not to freedom of information
between governments, but between peoples. But all efforts
hitherto made in the Commission on Human Rights of the
United Nations to secure a solid admission of the rights I have
mentioned have been rejected or blurred or stalled by the
representatives of the Soviet Union, sometimes assisted by
Jugoslavia.
The Implications
There is a graver implication of the Wilsonian principle and
the international bill of rights than has so far been considered.
Both constitute a denial of the idea of self-determination, and
as such are a frontal attack on the central principle of inter-
national law, recognized by custom, and clearly re-expressed
in the Act of Chapultepec, and blatant all over the articles
of the Charter of the United Nations. The denial is necessary
for peace. No one makes the denial more forcibly than the
Soviet Union : no nation practices the denial more vigorously
or exultantly. The denial is necessary, nevertheless. It has a
remarkable historical support in the practices of nations
against unruly neighbors in the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies. But the denial by the democratic nations will be milder,
more federative, than any alternative unitary principle, which
would be too stringent for local growth compatible with peace-
ful relations.
Fear and Force
Nothing like democratic assimilation is to be expected, in the
situation of the rift between the Western powers and the
Soviet Union, by persuasion of the kind we have discussed.
Something like assimilation on Soviet principles is being at-
tempted in Europe, by threat, or force, or such a state of
peacelessness, uproar, and mental assault that some nations
have succumbed.
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We can not expect the democratic view to prevail by per-
suasion alone. Even the extent of area under democratic rule,
or quasi-democratic rule, or to be amenable to it in some
decades to come, can not be maintained by persuasion alone,
for a mighty opponent is determined that this shall not be.
Between the direct use of force and the persuasions we
have considered stands an approach to force, if it is, at the
same time, a departure from persuasion— Fear. At this
juncture in history, all nations would be best off if there were
some common universal minimum fear to intimidate them
equally and simultaneously, something external to all, and
impartial. It was thought for some time that the fears pro-
voked by the advent of the atomic bomb would provide this
factor, and by doing so cause the nationalism of each country
to be voluntarily self-controlled, reduced in its temperature,
so that clashes between nations would be abolished. But the
extraordinary thing is, that in spite of the details of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, and the dramatizations by radio and press, the
peoples are extraordinarily calm, and according to the Gallup
Poll in America, not prepared as the possible price of peace
to surrender the manufacturing secrets to the world at large.
Nor does the Soviet Union show her fear of the bomb in the
form of accepting the very generous American proposals for
control of atomic energy. Their way of life is still so dear to
the nations that they will not allow themselves to be rattled
into peace
!
If, then, a common fear is not capable of reducing national
tension to a point promising peace, possible courses are the
banding together of all the nations against the most trouble-
some and least peaceful, or the unilateral exercise of power by
the one great industrial and populous power on the democratic
side for the same purpose, namely, to intimidate the trouble-
maker. Is there any exit from this logic? I wish there were.
But I do not think there is.
An appalling truth must be faced— all the states we know,
that is, the large territorial societies with fully ordered gov-
ernment, and sovereign power exercised through a permanent
legislature, executive, and judiciary, came into decisive being
{90}
as the result of the imposition of authority by Force. In the
background of their history may have been a very long evolu-
tion of other types of authority, the family, the folk, kinship,
rule by the elders, and these certainly exercised authority
which relied on reason, on persuasion, on religious belief, on
ethical concepts, on which there was a large amount of agree-
ment to be the basis of obedience. But, at a certain point in the
extension of area, in contact with other groups of differing
regimes, and the dynamic complication of social and economic
processes and evolution of ideas, an act of Force occurred,
since it became impossible for someone to tolerate an existence
in society without a common superior. This may have been a
minority which thus dominated, even a very small minority.
Time and forceful revolt broadened the possession of
authority to be more inclusive, to be, in the end, highly demo-
cratic. And while this process was evolving, the dominating
minority, whether resident or foreign, relaxed its severe rule
so that the military was transformed into civil rule of a milder
description.
A triple evolution proceeded (more subtle than the word
"triple" indicates) : of force from above combined with
reasonableness which tempered naked and absolute force; of
revolt and challenge by the groups and classes in quasi-sub-
jection; and a general growth of common morality, limiting
the claims of superior and inferior and admitting the claims
of each on the other. The common superior could be at least
equal to contending factions : and could at least provide a kind
of tranquillity and security for all, or almost all, even if not
on the most favorable conceivable terms, and this encouraged
movement throughout the kingdoms, and habits of peace,
which, again, lent authority to the common superior. The
process took centuries. We are more conscious today of
what can be done and what can not be done: our techniques
of government, and our wisdom not to be extreme in the use
of power give us hopes of a shorter process of pacification.
But the crude stages still seem to beckon those who seek peace,
because the common morality is not there : the pax Christiana
was long ago shattered into national fragments.
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Let us be sure of what history's logic is. It is not the logic
of immediate preventive war. It does not declare that either
the West or that Soviet Russia wants war, now or in the
future. No one wants war: but all want ways of life which
may lead to war. For many years, barring accidents (which
can not be ignored), there will be a peace of exhaustion, with
angry shouts across the seas and continents. But, if a settle-
ment is desired, assuming the continued existence of despotism
in Russia, there seems hardly a way out of the disciplinary
power of preponderant force in being and ready for use. It is
not pleasant to return to si vis pacem para helium.
It may be that so confronted, and warned betimes, and
warned incessantly, the one minority in the world which is
not only restive but aggressive, may take heed lest it lose all
its power within its own territory, as did the Nazi regime. The
power to stay in the Kremlin and rule the Russias, as they
have never been ruled before, by power quite absolute, with
modern techniques, is a mighty prize. It is not to be given up
lightly. Perhaps the Soviet rulers' attachment to it is so strong,
as I think it is, that a real threat of its loss will bring them
to a sensible state of mind. But for this the existence of pre-
ponderant power must be heavy and unintermittent.
If this power should not be provided, the world will fall
into a state of war on some trivial occasion, probably in the
Balkans again. If this, the establishment of preponderant force
should come about, then it would be idle to expect peace from
it, for any duration, unless that force were poised on certain
principles. These would not be the defense of capitalism; nor
the triumph of Catholicism, the residuary legatee of men's
despair, misery, and abdication of responsibility; nor economic
individualism ; nor monopoly. The principles would need to be
democracy and welfare— and before all, above all things, the
democratic government and the civil rights adverted to earlier
in this lecture. Should these principles not guide the mar-
shalling and maintaining of preponderant force, a war that
might come must be only the prelude to others. If they were,
indeed, our guides, civilization might get a breathing space.
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The race of men is under the dominion of a singular fate:
uncertainty of its large purpose and destiny. If any one
answer to human perplexity is fastened upon men by the
ultrasanguine, they rebel, because the answer is not one that
can satisfy them all, and certainly can not satisfy each suc-
ceeding generation. To be sought is not the narrowest but the
widest exit from perplexity, if men are to find their happiness
in the specific discoveries of their free reason, and happiness
and relief in freedom to seek, and in the exercise of free
inquiry and communication. In the long run, the polity best
calculated to open the way, to the tolerable maximum, and to
assist the discovery of tolerable values, is the democratic way.
It is for this reason that we must not flinch from defending
the democratic way of life when it is threatened imminently
and fatally. Man is an atom of explosive power— explosive
in his physique and his appetites and his need for an answer
about his destiny to the effect that he is right. All power
politics begins there. It ceases only in death. It lives best, most
abundantly, and with originality and richness, only in the free-
dom of wide democratic horizons. Power and force are blessed
when they seek to widen freedom, and it is a duty of man so
to use them.
"Freedom," said Burke, "they can have from none but you.
This is the commodity of price of which you have the
monopoly."
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